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Abstract
Kafka’s writings are frequently interpreted as representing the historical period of modernism in which he was writ-
ing. Little attention has been paid, however, to the possibility that his writings may reflect neural mechanisms in
the processing of self during hypnagogic (i.e., between waking and sleep) states. Kafka suffered from dream-like,
hypnagogic hallucinations during a sleep-deprived state while writing. This paper discusses reasons (phenomenolo-
gical and neurobiological) why the self projects an imaginary double (autoscopy) in its spontaneous hallucinations
and how Kafka’s writings help to elucidate the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms. I further discuss how
the proposed mechanisms may be relevant to understanding paranoid delusions in schizophrenia. Literature docu-
ments and records cognitive and neural processes of self with an intimacy that may be otherwise unavailable to
neuroscience. To elucidate this approach, I contrast it with the apparently popularizing view that the symptoms of
schizophrenia result from what has been called an operative (i.e., pre-reflective) hyper-reflexivity. The latter
approach claims that pre-reflective self-awareness (diminished in schizophrenia) pervades all conscious experience
(however, in a manner that remains unverifiable for both phenomenological and experimental methods). This con-
tribution argues the opposite: the “self” informs our hypnagogic imagery precisely to the extent that we are not
self-aware.
Background: The Natural vs. Human Sciences
i
Cognitive and clinical neuroscience face very real pro-
blems about the nature of the human self, how we
define and study “self,” and treat individuals when the
mind, or brain, becomes so disordered that the experi-
ence of self becomes disrupted. “Cognitive neuroscience”
contains the terms, “mind” and “brain,” respectively.
T h e s et e r m sr e m a i ni m p r e c i s ed u et oaf u n d a m e n t a l
ambiguity that we are both minds, i.e., being as e l f( s o -
called first-person experience), and brains or bodies, i.e.,
having a self (third-person perspective). The experienced
body (and implicated neural pathways) is comprised by
both a motoric-body (proprioceptive body-schema), the
“I” (as agent), and perceptual-body (exteroceptive body-
image), the social “me,” united provisionally and fragilely
by an interoceptive body (the “mineness” of this rela-
tionship). “Mineness” is disrupted in hallucinations of a
double or Doppelgänger.T h ev e r b a ld e s c r i p t o r s“I,”
“me,” and “mine,” h o w e v e r ,a r eo n l ya p p r o x i m a t i o n so f
the underlying neural processes [1-3]. We are generally
equipped with common-sense folk-psychological views
about self and how we experience other selves, which
help us get by in everyday situations. Nevertheless, the
self has turned out to be exceptionally difficult to define,
operationalize and study in neuroscience and related
disciplines. Many researchers in the fields of cognitive
science/neuroscience refer to the ability to recognize self
in the mirror, or make judgments involving oneself as
evidence of self, but this is one-sided. Much of the self-
awareness literature confuses mediated self-reference of
higher order cognition with being a self. It addresses the
self as object (having a self), not self as subject (being a
self). By overlooking this conceptual distinction,
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self-awareness, self as object) is confused with “being a
self” (e.g., Gusnard [4]). The current exclusive focus on
self as object ("self-representation,” rather than subject
of the experience) in neuroscience has its roots in the
19
th century division between the natural and human
sciences. The 19
th century dilemma is reflected in what
Levine [5] and numerous philosophers following him,
call the “explanatory gap” between neural processes and
qualia, i.e., what it is like to experience phenomenal
states.
The ‘human sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften,G e r m a n
translation of J.S. Mill’s ‘moral sciences’)a r eb a s e do n
the ’understanding’ of the ‘meaningful connections’
between historical events, whereas the natural sciences,
find causal explanations between postulated natural
entities [6]. Figure 1 indicates that natural sciences gen-
erally proceed from larger, often nebulous wholes, seek-
ing out explanatory relationships between ever-smaller,
strictly defined parts of these wholes. Explanation (e.g.
causal/mechanistic, statistical/probabilistic or functional/
teleological) tries to establish relationships between sub-
component parts. Conversely, the historical-human
sciences generally move ‘upwards’ from partial views to
ever-larger contexts for understanding the matter at
hand. Understanding is contextual by situating parts in
greater wholes, even if these totalities are not directly
available to the individual perspective but transcend or
Figure 1 Methods of the natural and the human-historical sciences. Opposed directionality between explanation (arrow pointing to
smallest circle) and understanding (arrow pointing from smallest circle), indicating the methods of the natural and human-historical sciences,
respectively. Natural sciences proceed in terms of the ‘classic reductionist hierarchy’ from sociology to psychology to biology, chemistry and
physics. They generally proceed from larger, rather nebulous wholes to seek out explanatory relationships between ever-smaller parts of these
wholes. Conversely, understanding is contextual by situating parts in ever-greater wholes, even if these totalities are ultimately unavailable to the
individual perspective but transcend or ‘encompass’ it. Each discipline requires an ‘abstraction, reduction to and idealization (i.e., “naming,”
Husserl) of the ‘objects’ or entities of its discipline (which exclude the objects of neighboring disciplines). Gray areas between disciplines indicate
interdisciplinary relationships which are often more fuzzy involving destabilizing relationships within interdisciplinary vocabulary and concepts. ,
physis (ύsις), physical-natural sciences; b, bios (bίος), biological sciences; ψ, psyche (ψυcή), psychological-cognitive sciences; π, polis (πόlις),
historical-cultural sciences. From Mishara [6]. Reprinted with permission from Wolters Kluwer.
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human sciences themselves stand in a historical process,
which is at the same time the object (as contextual
totality) of their study (Gadamer [8]).
Any claim to unify the natural and human sciences is
burdened by seemingly insurmountable problems. These
include the integration of two opposing directions of
method, the effort to make the contextual “understand-
ing” of subjective experience somehow “objective” and
testable in the terms of natural scientific explanation,
i.e., cognitive and neural processes and mechanisms.
However, I make the unconventional claim (requiring
justification) that Kafka’s literary writing provides data
about the structure of the human self.T h a ti s ,i td o c u -
ments processes that are not limited to the individual’s
experience of self in its historical context, nor the indivi-
dual’s “autobiographical” memory, but reflect the very
structure of human self as a transformative process of
self-transcendence (in symbolic dream images, a process
examined further below) with its own neurobiological
underpinnings, i.e., the rudiments for a discipline, “lit-
erary neuroscience.” Literature documents and records
cognitive and neural processes of self with an intimacy
that is otherwise unavailable to neuroscience.
Such an approach is phenomenological. Founded by
the mathematician turned philosopher, Edmund Husserl
(1859-1938), phenomenology is the rigorous, methodical
description of conscious experience and how the general
mental structures derived from its descriptive method
may be disrupted in neuropsychiatric disorders and
anomalous conscious states. In its step-wise method,
phenomenology approaches literary texts as providing
“data” about the general structures of consciousness and
anomalous states.
ii By offering theoretically neutral
descriptions of subjective experience (as far as this is
humanly possible), it provides a way out of the 19
th cen-
tury dilemma of studying human self as either object or
subject. Phenomenology proposes rather that the human
dilemma is to experience oneself as both subject and
object [9]. However, its results are provisional and may
be refined by more phenomenological investigation or
until tested with the experimental methods of
neuroscience.
Why is the Double a Ghost? A Child?
Let us start with Kafka’s early story, “Unhappiness“
(written in 1910) [10]. For our purposes, we may start
with nearly any of Kafka’s stories to demonstrate the
same structure of doubling [10-14], i.e., of the writer’s
self in the protagonist,
iii and then, a further doubling of
the protagonist in the characters he encounters.
iv
With an approaching November evening, the narrator
of “Unhappiness“ begins by stating that he finds things
unbearable (unerträglich). He turns away from the
window where the street lamps’ sudden illumination
startles him. Turning to the interior of his room, he
finds a new goal to pursue in the depths of his own
mirror (im Grund des Spiegels). The turning away from
the artificial light of the streets to the dark interior of
his own room and then his mirror suggest that he is
turning inward to examine the “depths” of his own self.
The mirror provides no answer to his loneliness and he
lets out a scream in order to hear it but no one will
answer. (The self-witnessing of expression but its ulti-
mate ineffectiveness in reaching others are major themes
further explored below); similarly, reflecting on one’s
own “inner” self also provides no answer (as in the dis-
cussion of The Bridge below). The scream meets no
resistance to reduce or stop it, even after it has already
become silent (suggesting that the scream does nothing
to diminish the pain which gives rise to it). As if in
response, however, the door opens from the wall (aus
der Wand heraus) and horses attached to wagons rise
(sich erheben) in the air. At that moment a small ghost,
a child, enters from a completely dark corridor where
the lamps are still unlit. She is blinded by the room lit
by dusk (Dämmerung) and covers her face. The narrator
states, “. . .i ns h o r t ,t h i sv i s i t ,t h o u g hIh a de x p e c t e di t ,
was the one thing needful” ([10], p. 391).
Many of the themes that concern us are announced:
the protagonist’s loneliness, turning inward, the mirror
and scream portending the sudden appearance of a dou-
ble;
v the narrator and his double (i.e., the child-ghost)
experience an over-sensitivity to light (photophobia);
and the transformed, dreamlike-twilight state (Dämmer-
ungzustand). All seem to reflect Kafka’so w ns t a t ea sa
writer. Curiously, the light of streetlamps and the dusk
(which are not particularly intense sources of light)
cause discomfort first in the narrator and then in the
ghost. We know that Kafka suffered from severe, possi-
bly cluster headaches [15], which may, in part, contri-
bute to his tendency (documented below) to withdraw
from excessive stimulation. The suggestion that the nar-
rator’s mental state and that of Kafka himself are closely
linked is supported by the fact that both live on the
third floor [16], p. 88
vi The word dusk (Dämmerung)
refers to the transitional light between day and night
when the ghost arrives but it also refers to the narrator’s
(writer’s) state of consciousness, a “twilight-state” (in
German, Dämmerungszustand), i.e., a transitional state
between waking and dreaming or sleep. Notably, the
ghost is born in this moment of need, of loneliness, the
searching of inner-depths in a mirror, giving rise to a
cry without resonance, or echo, and which never reaches
an audience. The fact that this unusual visit was some-
how “expected” by the narrator gives it a dream-like
quality. Even though the narrator reports bizarre, unu-
sual events (the ghost, the elevated horses), he does so
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experiences during waking consciousness. As a result,
these unusual turns of events are presented as expected
or, at least, not surprising. In this respect, Kafka’s narra-
tive resembles a dream.
Dreaming has been characterized as “single-minded”
[17]. In waking consciousness, we usually are able to
reflect on, compare, or recall experiences, or thoughts,
apart from the current one we are experiencing. It is
not that these processes are completely excluded during
dreaming - a counter-example is lucid-dreaming. It is
rather that they are massively attenuated so that dream-
ing is “isolated” from other capacities or functions of
consciousness. One finds a similar inability to transcend
one’s current perspective, to reflect on, monitor or con-
sider alternative views in acute psychosis of schizophre-
nia. As in dreaming, one is trapped in the “now”
[2,18,19]. Kafka’s stories and novels often depict this
sort of single mindedness which we find in dreaming.
For example, the sudden appearance of the unexpected
or bizarre is met with the protagonist’s blasé acceptance
as matter of course. In his novel, The Castle, Kafka
describes his protagonist, K., as taking the unexpected
as matter of course: “The particular instance surprised
K., but on the whole he had really expected it” [20], p. 5.
Once the ghost enters, the (lonely) narrative transi-
tions into a dialogue between narrator and ghost. As in
many Kafka stories, the protagonist and the figure(s) he
encounters are inextricably related, as if different parts
of the same person. Although the narrator states that
the visit was expected, he questions the ghost whether
she is really looking for him as so many people live in
the building. However, the ghost’s responses make clear
that their relationship is beyond the ordinary. She states,
“no stranger could come nearer to you than I am
already by nature” ([10], p. 393) (thus suggesting her
intimate relation to him as hallucinated double). The
narrator then protests, “Your nature is mine and if I feel
friendly to you by nature, then you musn’tb ea n y t h i n g
else” ([10], p. 393). That is, he insists that his double
mirror him and not the converse.
vi
Following these self-assertions, the narrator goes to a
night-table and lights a candle. Since no further dialo-
gue follows, the narrator presumably releases himself
from the apparition: Through lighting the candle? The
verbal self-assertion? Their combination? Leaving the
apartment, he meets a neighbor on the stairs and tells
h i ma b o u tt h eg h o s t .H es a y st ot h en e i g h b o r( i n s i g h t -
fully) that his real fear does not concern the ghost but
“what caused the apparition” ([10], p. 394). The narrator
continues, “The ghosts seem to be more dubious about
their existence than we are, and no wonder, considering
how frail they are” [10] p. 395. At this point, the neigh-
bor rejoins that he has heard that one may “fatten up”
(auffüttern)o n e ’s ghost (to which the narrator assents)
but then adds salaciously, “W h yn o t ?I fi tw e r eaf e m i -
nine ghost, for instance?”
vii
Still we may ask, why is the double a child? A ghost?
How does the “Brain” produce Hallucinations of a
Doppelgänger?
Let us compare this story with an actual clinical case of
seeing a double (what is termed autoscopy
viii):
After visiting the grave of her recently deceased hus-
band, a 56-year-old, retired schoolteacher returns home.
Upon opening the door, she senses that someone else is
in the house in which she is the only occupant. In the
twilight-lit room, she sees that another woman is stand-
ing in front of her. As she lifts her right hand to turn
on the electric light, the figure makes the same move-
ments with her left hand so that their hands meet. She
remarks that her own hand feels cold and bloodless
from the contact (Mishara [3], paraphrased from Lukia-
nowicz [21]).
As in Kafka’s “Unhappiness,” the scene is poorly lit
and occurs at dusk. It involves a mirroring of the
patient’s motoric-body
ix in that the double anticipates or
preempts the subject’s intention to switch on the light
[2,3,22-25].
Kafka describes looking in the mirror in his diary. As
in Unhappiness, the lighting is poor. The evening light
(Abendbeleuchtung) comes from behind and outlines a
darkened face which is “...unbelievably energetic, but
perhaps only because it was observing me, since I was
just observing myself and wanted to frighten myself”
([26], p. 247). The English translation is misleading. The
original German states only that the mirror-face “was
observing” (not that it “was observing me”), i.e., that the
mirror-face was observing Kafka observing himself.
x The
mirror-image takes on an independence from Kafka. As
now a third perspective, it observes Kafka’s relationship
to himself, i.e., a further doubling which “observes” Kaf-
ka’s own split relationship with himself (see also
[27,28]).
xi
Can Words Surmount the Rift between One’s Own
and Others’ Experience of Body?
In Kafka’s Metamorphosis (1912), Gregor Samsa (sug-
gesting, as we have already indicated, Kafka’so w n
name), finds himself - after awakening one night from
uneasy dreams - transformed into a verminous, gigantic
insect.
xii While his terrifying form (Schreckgestalt) clearly
r e p e l so t h e r s ,i tb e c o m e su s e f u lf o rG r e g o r[ 1 0 ] ,p .1 3 1 .
It exempts him from the expectations that others
impose on him. Having not yet seen him, his family and
the firm’s procurist are eager to get inside his bedroom
with the sole purpose of pressing him to return to his
obligations to them. Inside the room, the transformed
Mishara Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:13
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/13
Page 4 of 37Gregor speculates on their reaction once they see him:
“... he was eager to find out what the others, after all
their insistence, would say at the sight of him. If they
were horrified then the responsibility would no longer be
his and he could stay quiet. But if they took it calmly,
then he had no reason either to be upset, and could
really get to the station for the eight o’clock train if he
hurried” ([10], p. 98, my emphases). Since the second
alternative is implausible, his transformation exempts
him from his responsibility to support the family.
Aware of its powerfully repellant effects on others,
Gregor is alienated from his body image (as he both
sees it and how he imagines it to appear to others
[3,22-25]). With regard to Kafka’s own body image, Gil-
man [29] asks: “What would Kafka see while looking in
the mirror?” (p. 54). By carefully documenting the asso-
ciations between “illness,”“ ugliness,” and the “femin-
ized” Jewish male body as expressed by the prevailing
anti-semitism at the time, Gilman articulates some of
the factors which presumably impacted Kafka’so w n
experience of “body image.” In Kafka’s The Trial [30],
young girls (including a young precociously sexual, but
disfigured child, reminding us of the seductive child
ghost in Unhappiness) taunt the protagonist, Josef K.,
through the closed door of the painter-artist Tintoretto’s
studio. The fact that it is an “artist’s” studio already
gives us some impetus to think that there must be some
association between this “artistic” activity and Kafka’s
own writing activity. The children cry out that Josef K.
is too “ugly” t op a i n t[ 3 0 ] ,p .1 5 0 ,s u g g e s t i v eo fK a f k a ’s
own discomfort with body image. Elements of Unhappi-
ness are repeated in this scene from The Trial (e.g., the
door, the child, sexual undertones).
Gregor’s sense of agency or motoric-body (i.e., body-
schema and its connection with the vital-interoceptive
body [3,22-25]) is also compromised: 1) His “numerous
little legs... never stopped waving in all directions...
which he could not control in the least” [10], p. 92; 2)
“...weakness arising from extreme hunger, made it
impossible to move” ([10], p. 132). In a manner which
at least superficially resembles the muscular paralysis
(atonia) of REM sleep dreaming and the hallucinatory
nightmare experiences of narcoleptic sleep paralysis,
Kafka also describes a similarly incapacitated motoric-
body in A Country Doctor shortly after the doctor awa-
kens (see below). The transformed Gregor also has sen-
sitivity to light which he avoids (not unlike Kafka
himself and the protagonist and his ghostly double in
Unhappiness).
Gregor stops eating and sleeping to hasten the
encroaching death of his hateful-body.
xiii In the end, he
is just a “thing” (Zeug) disposed of by the elderly char-
woman. Gregor’sf a t h e rp r e v e n t st h ec h a r w o m a nf r o m
explaining how she disposed of Gregor and the rest of
the family appears indifferent.
xiv For the others around
him, Gregor becomes an object, a body stripped of
human subjectivity.
As already emphasized, the claustrophobic conflation
of the narrator’sa n dp r o t a g o n i s t ’s perspectives, or the
doubling of the author as protagonist, who, in turn, con-
fronts his own doubles during the course of the narra-
tive, are common features in Kafka’ss t o r i e s .
xv The
protagonist is the closest double to Kafka himself and,
as surrogate, is the primary means by which Kafka pre-
sumably reaches the reader. Therefore, we will want to
clarify why the protagonist’s body as the narrator’sd o u -
ble (in its hidden reflexive relationship to the very writ-
ing process which creates it) is found to be
unsubstantial as in the child ghost or is eventually
destroyed leading to the protagonist’s death.
xvi The
Metamorphosis begins with Gregor’s transformation
around Christmas and ends with Gregor’s death around
Easter. The timing is critical for understanding the story
and we will return to its possible meaning.
Does Loneliness Induce the Social Network in the
Brain to Become More Active?
The psychological researchers, Epley et al. [31] have
implemented studies which suggest that people who feel
lonely or lack social connection tend to attribute human
characteristics to non-human objects, e.g., machines,
pets, or transcendent “objects (such as God).” They
“anthropomorphize” these objects “by inventing human-
like agents in their environment to serve as potential
sources of connection” (p. 114). The researchers con-
clude “those who lack social connection with other
humans may try to compensate by creating a sense of
human connection with nonhuman agents.” When they
manipulated the mood of healthy subjects by showing
them frightening film-clips (Silence of the Lambs), the
fearful subjects - compared with control-subjects
exposed to a non-fearful film-clip - tended to see faces
and fear-related stimuli in ambiguous, neutral drawings.
In a similar vein, individuals isolated for long periods
(e.g., mountaineers, explorers, sailors, and castaways)
report a variant of the Doppelgänger experience, the
“feeling of a presence.” The “double” is felt (but not
seen) to be nearby often at a precise distance from the
subject [3]. The brain’s construction of otherness is acti-
vated by emotional states of loneliness and fear (includ-
ing paranoid states and possibly, psychosis). Loneliness
and other forms of social deprivation may induce the
social networks in the brain (i.e., those brain networks
subserving social cognition) to become more active on
their own resulting in Doppelgänger experiences or hal-
lucinations, as Kafka’s child-ghost, but how?
The reduction of social connection leads to the con-
struction of imaginary other(s). The deprivation of
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ing healthy individuals of sight via blindfolding for pro-
longed periods leads to visual hallucinations [32]. If
blindfolding is sustained for a day or more, both simple
(bright spots of light) and complex (faces, landscapes,
ornate objects) hallucinations result.
xvii Visual and other
hallucinations involve activity-increases in the cortical
areas that give rise to them [33]. Therefore, cortical
excitability may be related to the auditory and visual
hallucinations reported by patients with schizophrenia.
This concurs with Hoffman’s [34] hypothesis of sensory/
social “deafferentation” (i.e., reduction of sensory input)
in schizophrenia. Hoffman et al. [35] found that slow-
frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS), which decreases the excitability of the underly-
ing cortex, reduced the incidence and severity of treat-
ment-resistant auditory hallucinations (when applied to
the temporo-parietal region).
Cortical hyperexcitability would be consistent with the
deficits in GABA (the major inhibitory neurotransmitter
in the brain) revealed by postmortem studies in schizo-
phrenia-patients (Lewis et al. [36]). GABA levels have
been shown to reduce within minutes of light-depriva-
tion [37]. It is interesting that the neurobiological evi-
dence supports what phenomenological and existential
thinkers e.g., [38,39], have been proposing for years: to
withdraw into the self, to remove oneself from others, is
paradoxically to discover the other, or others, within
oneself, that is, self and other(s) are inextricably related.
xviii
What relevance do the neurobiological studies
have to Kafka’s writings?
Kafka deliberately scheduled his writing during the night
in a sleep-deprived state
. It is also known that he drew
from hypnagogic imagery in his stories [40]. In his Dia-
ries, Kafka describes his nocturnal writing as conducted
“entirely in darkness, deep in his workshop” [26], p. 518;
see also [14]. As Kafka reports, writing without sleep
enables access to unusual thoughts and associations
which otherwise would be inaccessible: “How easily
everything can be said as if a great fire had been pre-
pared for all these things in which the strangest
thoughts emerge and again disappear” [26], pp. 293-4,
my translation). With regard to this transformed state of
consciousness, he writes, “all I possess are certain
powers which, at a depth almost inaccessible at normal
conditions, shape themselves into literature...” [41],
p. 270.” Similarly, Kafka writes in his Diaries, “Again it
was the power of my dreams, shining forth into wakeful-
ness even before I fall asleep, which did not let me
sleep... I feel shaken to the core of my being and can get
out of myself whatever I desire. It is a matter of ... mys-
terious powers...” (cited by Corngold, [42], p. 23). Sleep
deprivation may serve as a non-drug “psychotomimetic”
model (i.e., producing a psychotic like state in healthy
individuals) with attendant changes in dopamine in the
striatum and NMDA and AMPA ionotropic glutamate
receptor function in pre-frontal cortex [43]. Indirectly,
this suggests a possible relationship between intrusive
hypnagogic imagery (which is increased with sleep
deprivation) and the experiences of beginning psychosis
[44], and below.
Kafka’s “great fire” suggests a creative process which
provides its own illumination even in darkness. It also
suggests a state of cortical excitability (and resulting
hypnagogic hallucinations) following Kafka’sw i t h d r a w a l
from sensory/social stimuli coupled with sleep depriva-
tion. Kafka longs for “complete stillness” (as Gregor in
The Metamorphosis) eager to separate himself, while
writing, from his argumentative family with whom he
lived for a good part of his life.
xix The Hunger Artist
“withdraws deep within himself paying no attention to
anyone or anything” [10], p. 268. Kafka is avoidant of
unnecessary stimulation, which may also be prompted
by his severe headaches [15], and sleeplessness [12],
p. 231. However, the withdrawal from photic and social
stimulation is also prerequisite for the self-induction of
hypnagogic-like trances.
Kafka marveled at the automaticity of his own writing.
In a letter to his future betrothed, Felice Bauer - whom
he persistently tries to discourage, as evidenced by this
letter, from wanting to marry him - Kafka writes: “I
have often thought that the best mode of life for me
would be to sit in the innermost room of a spacious
locked cellar with my writing things and a lamp. Food
would be brought and always put down ... outside the
cellar’s outermost door. ... And how I would write! From
the depths I would drag it up! Without effort! For
extreme concentration knows no effort” [41], p. 156).
Here we find solitude, the reduction of sensory stimula-
tion in the cell’s darkness, and the automaticity (effort-
lessness) of the writing process. According to Kafka’s
own reports, he experienced writing (at least in its initial
phases) as automatic, effortless and informed by hypna-
gogic imagery.
xxx When writing is effortless, it is the
product of a trance-state called “flow” shown to facilitate
optimal mental functioning (Csikszentmihalyi, [45]).
Kafka writes, “All I possess are certain powers which, at
a depth inaccessible under normal conditions, shape
themselves into literature...” [ 4 1 ] ,p .2 7 0 ) .I nal e t t e rt o
Max Brod, Kafka [46] writes that it is “not alertness but
self-oblivion [that] is the precondition of writing”
(p. 385).
While Kafka was writing, the psychoanalyst, Herbert
Silberer, in 1909, conducted introspective experiments
[47]. Sleepy one afternoon, he struggles to think through
a philosophical problem. To his astonishment, the
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the concepts he was just considering but now in pictor-
ial-visual form (as if in a rebus puzzle). Such images or
hallucinations, which are experienced between waking
and sleep, are called hypnagogic (hypnagogic from Gk.
hupnos ‘sleep’ + agōgos ‘leading’ (from agein ‘to lead’,
thus a leading into sleep). Encouraged by this observa-
tion, he conducts introspective experiments observing
what happens while attempting to maintain cognitive
effort as best he can while falling asleep. He concludes
that the hallucination “... puts forth ‘automatically’ ... an
adequate symbol of what is thought (or felt) at a given
instant” p. 196 [47]. Silberer gives the example of falling
asleep while thinking through a solution he later admits
“forces a problem into a preconceived scheme.” His
thinking is followed by the hypnagogic-symbolic image:
“I am pressing a Jack-in-the-Box into the box. But every
t i m eIt a k em yh a n da w a yi tb o u n c e so u tg a i l yo ni t s
spiral spring” p. 204 [47]. He interprets the hypnagogic-
image to be “autosymbolic.” Its content refers to the
thought process, mental-function or feeling in conscious
awareness that just preceded it before falling asleep. It
occurs in the “transitional,”“ twilight” state between
sleep and waking in which hypnagogic/hypnopompic
images are spontaneously produced. Critically, the auto-
symbolic hallucination requires that the subject is una-
ware at the time that his own mind is producing it or its
symbolic meaning. Pertinent to our analysis, the phe-
nomenological psychiatrist, Klaus Conrad drew similar
conclusions both from introspective observations of hyp-
nagogic imagery and his clinical observations of para-
noid psychosis in early schizophrenia, see [48,49] and
below. For discussion of the limited reception of Sil-
berer’s work, see [50].
Why death? The unfinished inner journey, caught
between worlds
Kafka associated the process of writing with the trance-
like, effortless hypnagogic hallucinatory process, which
produces doubles. The doubles reflect Kafka, his own
writing activity at the moment, and presumably result
from the increased cortical excitability of a social net-
work (activated during states of deprivation, sensory,
social and sleep). In another letter to Felice, Kafka, how-
ever, introduces the relationship between his writing
and death: “What I need for my writing is seclusion, not
‘like a hermit’, that would not be enough, but like the
dead. Writing, in this sense, is a sleep greater than
death, and just as one would not and could not tear the
dead from their graves, so I must not and cannot be
torn from my desk at night” [41], p. 279).
In his story fragment which begins with the line, “I
was a visitor among the dead,” Kafka [51] writes, “It was
a large clean vault... two coffins were open, inside they
looked like rumpled beds from which people had just
gotten up. A desk stood to one side, so that I did not
notice it at once; a man of powerful build (mit mächti-
gem Körper) s a ta ti t .I nh i sr i g h th a n d ,h eh e l dap e n
(eine Feder), as though he had just been writing and had
only just stopped. His left hand was toying with a shin-
ing watch chain on his waistcoat and his head was bent
low towards it (der Kopf war tief zu ihr hinabgeneigt). A
charwoman was sweeping up the place, but there was
nothing to be swept up” [51]. The charwoman instructs
the visitor to speak with the man with tilted head but to
no avail. The man does not respond but remains
motionless. Here several elements come together: writing
(symbolized by the writing desk and pen) is associated
with the underworld (i.e., the depths of the self [1]), but
also the narrator’s powerful double (i.e., who, unlike the
child ghost, does not require “fattening,” but whose una-
vailability, at the same time, disempowers the protago-
nist), who had just been writing is now motionless, with
head bent down, suggesting sleep or - in the current
vault environment, and the no longer heeded pocket
watch - death.
The Prince, in Kafka’s story, The Warden of the Tomb,
is owner of the castle’s Friedrichspark and its tomb. He
expresses the following desire: “For my family this tomb
represents the frontier between the Human and the
Other (die Grenze zwischen dem Menschlichen und dem
Anderen)a n di t so nt h i sf r o n t i e rt h a tIw i s ht op o s ta
guard” [10], p. 207 (my insert). The prince, however, is
surprised to hear that his own warden, elderly and
exhausted, already guards the tomb. Moreover, the old
man reports that he neither dreams nor sleeps but must
remain awake each night (as Kafka himself in his writ-
ing). He must hold “wrestling bouts” with the ghosts (i.
e., doubles) to prevent them from escaping from the
p a r k .A sw es h a l ls e ei nK a f k a ’s “Burrow,” there is a
nebulous boundary between worlds (and states of mind)
which must be protected, overseen, fortified, in what the
Prince’s chamberlain calls, “a real guarding of unreal
things beyond the human sphere” [10], p. 207. In his
stories Unhappiness and The Warden of the Tomb,K a f -
ka’s writing gives rise to ghostly doubles. This process
may reflect the excitation of brain areas responsible for
social experience of others and possibly, hypnagogic hal-
lucinations. But why does Kafka make the further move
of connecting his writing with death?
In A Country Doctor, which unfolds like a dream, the
doctor is prepared for a journey (reisefertig)t ot r e a ta
seriously-ill patient some ten miles away. His horse,
however, has died during the night due to overexertion
(perhaps reflecting Kafka’s own nocturnal exertion). As
he stands in the courtyard, he finds himself more and
more unable to move (immer unbeweglicher werdend)
and the snow starts to cover him. The previous
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bility (both recalling The Metamorphosis) describe Kaf-
ka’s own being transfixed by the hypnagogic imagery he
records (but also shapes) while writing. The doctor then
kicks at the rotting, broken-door of his pigsty unused
for years in an absent-minded (zerstreut)m a n n e r( p e r -
haps again reflecting Kafka’s own trance-state). From
these small quarters, a man, crouching, emerges, crawls
out on all fours, suggesting infancy or a self-generated
birth. He asks whether he should hitch the horses,
which soon follow from out of this same small “door
whole” (Türloch) as if emerging from a birth canal in a
strange process of twin birth to which we will return
when discussing The Burrow. The man, a servant, who
eventually overpowers the doctor, is often interpreted as
representing the doctor’s/Kafka’s primitive instinctual
side. He is somehow acquainted with the doctor’s
thoughts and wishes without the doctor having to express
them [14], p. 120. In a dream (or fictive narrative) all
characters are to a certain extent projections of the
dreamer’s/author’s mind. Therefore, the figures as
expressions of the same self, should in principle, have
access to the thoughts of any other character. We see a
similar feature in both paranoid delusions and auto-
scopic-hallucinations in which others (e.g., the auto-
scopic-doubles, as intimately and inextricably linked
with self) have access to one’s own thoughts/intentions,
even anticipating them [3,48].
If the servant at first helps the doctor, he becomes
impertinent, and bites the face of the servant-girl. The
doctor warns: “You’re coming with me... or I won’tg o ,
urgent as my journey is” [10], p. 221). In response, the
servant claps his hands and the doctor’sc a r r i a g ei sc a r -
ried away by the horses like a piece of wood in a strong
current (wie Holz in die Strömung). The doctor’s ineffec-
tiveness and ultimately passive role, which only
increases as the story develops, is not unlike a dreamer
who suffers the automaticity of the dream’s events.
The doctor then encounters a second double quite dif-
ferent than the servant, a young male patient, who,
without shirt, places his arms around the doctor’sn e c k
and addresses the doctor as “Du.” These are unusually
familiar gestures for a first meeting.
xx The ensuing dia-
logue occurs like a “conversation with oneself” (Selbstge-
spraech) [14], p. 125. The youth asks the doctor to let
him die, but the doctor believes there is nothing wrong
with him. However, once the doctor sees the fatal ser-
iousness of the wound
, the youth, “quite blinded by the
life within his wound,” reverses his request: “Will you
save me?” [10], p. 224). That is, precisely in their being
linked, they reverse their positions with regard to one
another, a reverse mirroring, in which each takes the
counter-position to his complement. The wound is
described as pink (rosa), and we are meant to think of
the doctor’s servant girl whose name is Rosa. When the
doctor first sees the wound, he is tempted to whistle
softly (Wer kann das ansehen ohne leise zu pfeifen?)
Kurz [14] writes, “the worms turning in the wound and
the whistling are both expressions of erotic desire and
death” (p. 127). However, there is also “life within his
wound” [ 1 0 ] ,p .2 2 4 .T h e r e f o r e ,i tn o to n l ys u g g e s t s
death, but also procreation and ultimately, birth.
T h ef a m i l ya n dv i l l a g e - e l d e r ss t r i pt h ed o c t o ro fh i s
clothes and place him next to the boy on the side of his
wound. Their bed also has the meaning of a coffin. We
have seen Kafka’s association of bed with coffin in his
fragment, “I was a visitor among the dead“ [51]. In
Jung’s [52] analysis of the woodcuts in the alchemical
work, Rosarium Philosophorum (1550), one of the stages
in the alchemical process is depicted as two figures,
King and Queen, who are joined into one figure in a
tomb in a similar manner to the strange union between
the doctor and his patient in A Country Doctor (see
figure 2).
With regard to another woodcut, Jung [52] describes
the symbol of the mercurial fountain in the alchemical
text as a symbol of rebirth or transformation of the self
(see figure 3): “the gushing up and flowing back of the
Mercurial fountain (an alchemical symbol) within its
basin completes a circle, and this is the essential charac-
teristic of Mercurius because he is also that serpent that
fertilizes, kills, devours itself and brings itself to birth
again” [52] p. 48 (my parenthetical insertion). This “[w]
holeness is a combination of I and You, and these show
themselves to be part of a transcendent unity, whose
nature can only be grasped symbolically as the symbols
of... the coniunctio Solis et Lunae“ i.e., the conjunction
of sun and moon, male and female, conscious and
unconscious. However, “[t]hese images are naturally
only anticipations of a wholeness which is, in principle,
just beyond reach.” [52], p. 157. Jung’so b s e r v a t i o n s
about the symbolism of self parallels - in what Jung
himself calls “syncretism” - the work of his contempor-
ary phenomenological psychiatrists and neurologists. As
I will document, Jung’s concept of self as rebirth over-
laps with the phenomenologic-existential view of self as
ongoing self-transcendence or self-displacement of one’s
current position. Jung’s contemporary, Viktor von Weiz-
säcker, neurologist, phenomenologist, sense-physiologist,
and celebrated “founder” of psychosomatic medicine in
Germany, writes that we only come to awareness of self,
not as a pre-reflective given, but reflectively. We require
and obtain self-awareness only when its presumed pre-
reflective unity is threatened, and we only ‘resolve’ the
crisis by paradoxically letting ourselves go: “We only
first really notice our own subjectivity when it is threa-
tened to dissolve in crisis. ... The subject is not a firm
possession but must be acquired anew at each moment
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constituted in its ongoing incessant reestablishing itself
in crisis and its own infirmity” [53], p.173 (my
translation).
The self, which comes to expression in doubles through
the spontaneous production of symbolic hypnagogic, or
dream images, is at once a self-transcendent and a self-
regenerating process. The sharing of the bed with the
youth, the symbolism of self-generation of the wound,
the youth’s reversal of attitude from wanting to die to
wanting to live (in contra-step to the country doctor’s
impressions about the severity of the wound) all suggest
the rebirth of the self (as self-transcending, self-regener-
ating). It is a journey which neither the doctor, (nor any
of Kafka’s characters, who find themselves - precisely as
fictional stand-ins for Kafka himself - on unending jour-
neys, (e.g., The Hunter Graccus, The Bucket Rider,s e e
below) are able to complete.
Hypnagogic Labyrinth: Conduit for Rebirth?
According to Dorothy Diamant, with whom Kafka was
then living, The Burrow (1922-3) was composed in a
single night. As one of his last stories, it is incomplete.
Along with other manuscripts, Diamant may have
burned the ending at Kafka’sr e q u e s t -i nf r o n to fh i s
eyes- to purge his soul from “ghosts” (Murray [54],
p. 372).
xxi The Burrow may reflect the newly acquired
contentment and reduced loneliness through the rela-
tionship with Diamant, but also (as Diamant interprets
the story) his fears of returning to the old life bereft of
this contentment. Kafka writes in the voice of an uni-
dentified animal who constructs the burrow, “I live in
peace in the heart of my burrow, and meanwhile from
somewhere or other the enemy is boring his way slowly
towards me” (cited by Murray [54], p. 371).
In remarkable interweaving, this story contains the
various leitmotivs we have discussed up till now: dupli-
cation of the author’s self in the animal-narrator who
builds the burrow, Kafka’s writing as work or building
reflected in the animal’s construction of the borrow, the
relation between literary writing and the transformed
mental-state during dreaming,
xxii the withdrawal from
sensory/social stimulation, reflected in the animal’s
desire for “stillness” and removal from others
xxiii which
eventually reverses into a paranoid-state,
xxiv and a
theme, which so far has remained implicit, the yearning
for rebirth of self.
The architecture of the burrow is complex: 1) the cen-
tral Burgplatz (alternatively translated as “Castle Keep,”
“Castle Court” or “Castle square”), is located “not quite
in the middle.” While the rest of the burrow is “the out-
come rather of intense intellectual rather than physical
Figure 2 Woodcut from the Alchemical Work, Rosarium Philosophorum (1550) indicating one of the stages in the alchemical process:
the Tomb. This resembles the strange union between the doctor and his patient in Kafka’s A Country Doctor, which is at once a dying and
being reborn.
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arduous labor of my body in all its parts” [10], pp. 321-
8, translation modified;
xxv 2) smaller chambers for provi-
sions; 3) connecting, crisscrossing passages and 4) an
entrance and exit (see Kurz, 2007, p. 341). “What most
disturbs the animal ‘I’ are the entrance and exit to the
burrow... secured by a labyrinth” [ 5 5 ] ,p .3 3 7 ) .A l lt h e
more remarkable that the animal-narrator should choose
- after discovering that the rustling-noise of the invading
other has penetrated as far as his Castle Keep - to perch
himself just below the flimsy moss-covering (which
alone keeps out the external world): “I stray so far that I
find myself at my own labyrinth... Here under the moss-
covering is perhaps the only place in my burrow where
I can listen for hours and hear nothing. A complete
reversal of things in the burrow; what was once the
place of danger has become a place of tranquility...”
(p. 352). Kurz [55] comments on the animal narrator’s
preoccupation with the “rustling-noise” (in German,
rauschen, also suggesting, the German word, “Rausch,”
intoxication, a “rush” or transformed state): “In silence,
we can already hear our own circulation rustling”
(p. 344). The psychologist, Jerome Singer [56] observes
that hypnagogic hallucinations “may be characterized by
a great rustling in the ears which sounds as if there are
huge crowds in the street.” In The Burrow, the animal at
first believes that the rustling-noise “...cannot be from a
single animal... it must be ... a huge swarm of little crea-
tures...” [10], p. 347. In The Castle,t h ep r o t a g o n i s t ,
K. while trying to make a telephone call to the castle,
Figure 3 Woodcut from the Alchemical Work, Rosarium Philosophorum (1550): the Mercurial fountain, which Jung (1969) interprets as
symbolizing the self as the ongoing integrational effort of a conjunction of opposites.
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less children’s voices-but yet not a hum, the echo rather
of voices singing at an infinite distance. . .” [20]. Kafka’s
description in these passages of acousmatic sound, i.e.,
sound without identifiable source, has recently captured
the interest of music theoreticians (Brian Kane, Depart-
ment of Music, Yale University, personal communica-
tion). As we examine further below in Kafka’s story, The
Bridge, the sound of rushing water figures in a manner
that will connect it to the death/rebirth motif in The
Burrow.
As we have seen in A Country Doctor, the doctor, in a
moment of desperation and absent-mindedness, kicks in
the pig-sty door only to discover that the man-servant
crawls out, later followed by what seems to be the most
peculiar twin birth of two unearthly horses. Kurz [14]
observes that “the wriggling out of the horses from out
of the door-whole (Türloch) describes a process, which
has an erotic meaning” (p. 121, my translation). But it is
not only that, the process also suggests a birth. As Kafka
writes, “the two horses, enormous creatures with power-
ful flanks, one after the other, their legs tucked close to
their bodies... by sheer strength of buttocking squeezed
out through the door whole which they filled entirely”
[10], p. 220 (in the original German: nur durch die Kraft
der Wendungen ihres Rumpfes aus dem Türloch, das sie
restlos ausfüllten). With their limbs close to their bodies,
like fetuses, they fill the whole completely from which
they press themselves outwards in sequence.I nThe Bur-
row, the rather fragile moss-covering (Moosdecke) which
conceals the animal’s “whole of safety” (Rettungsloch),
suggesting the pubic area, has this double meaning of
eroticism and birth. But in the manner of originally
‘unconscious’ symbols with their attendant “overdeter-
mined” meanings (as they emerge in the initially hypna-
gogic or spontaneously experienced narrative image
during trance-like writing states), the pig-sty door and
the moss-covering have still another meaning beyond
the rather obvious suggestion of the female birth canal.
In a manner yet to be examined, they indicate a thresh-
old ("door”) between worlds and states of mind and
thus refer reflexively to the very writing process that
gives rise to them.
The burrow’s architecture (der Bau (German title for
the story) = Körperbau, bodily frame) suggests human
anatomy. The animal as fetus - resting just under the
moss-covering (Moosdecke) - travels the birth canal in a
rebirth process. Once the animal leaves the burrow, he
finds himself in the predicament of how to keep watch
on it (from outside) and, at the same time, safely return
to it. He ponders that he requires a double, “someone of
my own kind ... a hermit” (in German, Waldbruder,
which contains the word “brother,” suggesting a twin or
double). Even if this double, however, were to keep
watch for him, while he returned to his safe-haven, “I
think I would refuse to let him in, even though he alone
made it possible to get into the burrow... for either I
must let him go in first by himself, which is simply
unimaginable, or we must both descend at the same
time, in which case the advantage I am supposed to
derive from him, that of being kept watch over would
be lost.” Were the double to remain outside, the animal
would also be unable to keep watch of him. Thus, enter-
ing the whole of safety (Rettungsloch) with his double in
the burrow must be sequential (a twin-birth!).
Due to his inability to “trust” the hypothetical-double,
the animal decides against letting him enter the burrow.
xxvi Rather than doubling the self, he envisions doubling
the entrances (”verdoppeln zwei Eingänge”). After he
descended the one, he could rapidly exit the proximate
one and thus quickly achieve a perspective on himself
and his construction: “I should have so constructed the
first passages that it had two entrances at a moderate
distance from each other, so that after descending
through the one entrance with that slowness that is una-
voidable, I might rush at once through the passage to
the second entrance, slightly raise the moss covering,
which would be so arranged as to make that easy, and
from there keep watch on the position...” (p. 338). The
disproportional speed with which the animal is able to
enter the one whole and escape from the other suggests
the difference between the prolonged gestation of birth
(entering) and the state of death (exiting) which, once
accomplished, is sudden and irreversible. In the story, A
Bridge (discussed in the next section), as well as here in
The Burrow, the attempt to create a double-perspective
on oneself through reflection, or (retrospective, successive)
self-observation (in time) ultimately fails.
Why has the animal constructed a labyrinth just
beneath the moss-covering? It is a labyrinth which
causes the animal physical pain to traverse: “So I must
thread the tormenting complications of this labyrinth
physically when I go out, and ...as sometimes happens, I
lose myself for a moment in my own maze...” [10]p. 333,
translation modified).
xxvii The labyrinth motif may refer
to Virgil’s Aeneid (Book VI) (cf. 55, p. 339). Here,
Aeneas begins his trip to the underworld by entering
through the Cumaen Gates fashioned by Daedelus. The
latter had painted on the Gates’ surface the labyrinth he
constructed in Crete to imprison the Minotaur. Some
commentators point out that Virgil’s attentive descrip-
tion of Daedelus’ labyrinth painting delays Virgil’sp o e m
“needlessly.” W.F.J. Knight [57], however, counters that
it is “an effective poetic symbol, suggesting the difficulty
and confusion involved by a journey into the earth” (pp.
21-2). In a noteworthy integration of classical philologi-
cal scholarship and archaeology, Knight traces the his-
tory of the labyrinthine symbol. He finds the first
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carved into stone placed before and inside prehistoric
burial caves in which the dead were placed in fetal posi-
tion. The spirals had an apotropaic function of trapping
evil spirits who become caught in their labyrinthine
structure while entering the caves. Knight continues to
trace the defensive labyrinthine spiral in the ancient city
of Troy’s battlements (recounted in The Iliad), the “rope
dance” performed before the city, and the preserved
maidenhood of Troy’s virgins symbolizing the city’s
impregnability. Therefore, it seems fitting that Virgil
depicts Aeneas - a Trojan general, who escapes the
fallen city of Troy and on his way to eventually founding
Rome, - as confronted with Daedelus’ depiction of the
labyrinth before entering the underworld. Nevertheless,
the labyrinthine spiral has still another meaning. In
summarizing the various sources for his argument,
Knight concludes that the labyrinth has the meaning of
“access to the earth mother,” depicting the earth
mother’s intestines and thus the promise of spiritual and
physical rebirth. Ancient “Greek initiation contained the
idea of rebirth by entry into the earth, originally by a
cave” [57], p. 53).
Similarly, the moss-covering, labyrinthine-intestines
just underneath the covering, and the internal architec-
ture of the burrow suggest the female reproductive anat-
omy and, indirectly, Kafka’s own creative writing process
as a rebirth of self. This is accomplished in terms of the
autosymbolic function of hypnagogic imagery, but is a
process, which - for reasons yet to be discussed -
remains incomplete.
Once the animal returns to his burrow, he experiences
renewed vigor. This is presumably due to the rebirth-
process symbolized as a descent into the underworld of
the burrow, which must painfully traverse the convolu-
tions of its own labyrinthine structure: “Ih a v ec h a n g e d
my place, I have left the upper world and am in my bur-
row, and I feel its effect at once. It is a new world,
endowing me with new powers, and what I felt as fati-
gue up there is no longer that here” (p. 341).
As far as I know, Kafka’s apparent wish for rebirth is
not addressed in the secondary literature but appears to
inform Kafka’sw r i t i n g sas if the writing itself were a
kind of rebirth of self accomplished through its hypnago-
gic-doubling process.A sw eh a v ee x a m i n e da b o v e ,G r e -
gor Samsa’s metamorphosis begins at Christmas
(Christ’s birth) and ends with his death around Easter
(Christ’s resurrection). Kafka’s symbolic-images of jour-
ney or rebirth indicate a threshold between worlds or
mental-states. To experience rebirth through writing,
through the spontaneous, symbolic self-transformation
of hypnagogic-imagery, requires a different mental-state,
a trance-state open to the unconscious, symbolic
formation of images as an inner (transformative) “jour-
ney” of the self (cf. Jung, [52]).
Quest for Wholeness: Narrative as Doubling Self
The structure of the self is organized in terms of its
relation to others (intersubjectivity). For Husserl [58],
intersubjectivity is possible through doubling my experi-
ence as “body-subject” (in German word, Leib, related to
leben,t ol i v e ) .“T h i si ss ob e c a u s em yb o d yi sa l r e a d y
always there in the perceptual field as body-subject”
[58], p. 62, my translation). My body serves as the pro-
totypical body-subject (Urleib) for how I experience
others as embodied whereby I attribute to others the
same inner relationship to their bodies as I do to mine.
Intersubjectivity is a doubling process.A st h eF r e n c h
phenomenological philosopher, Merleau-Ponty [59]
writes: “The other is born from my side.” The phenom-
enological psychiatrist Jaspers [60] reports a schizophre-
nia patient who experiences this quite literally: “Ih a d
the feeling that somebody was inside me and then, how
would you say it, left me by my side?... If I stood up, he
stood up. If I started to walk, he started to walk. He
always remained at the same place [behind me]. If I
turned around to see him, he also turned around at the
same time so that I was unable to see him. ...” (p. 415,
my translation). Others are doubles of my embodied
self. It is not surprising that loneliness or fear induces
the social network in the brain (responsible for my
experience of other minds) to actively produce imagin-
ary doubles of the self. The cognitive neural mechan-
isms underlying the self as a process which
spontaneously produces hypnagogic images of doubling
have their basis in Husserl’s theory of embodied inter-
subjectivity, an alternative to the prevalent theory of
mind construct in cognitive psychology [3,61]).
The fictional narrative (as a hypnagogic-doubling
process and underlying neural activity) symbolizes its
own incompleteness by not being able to impart the
subjective self (as it is experienced on the inside) to an
audience. Kafka’ss t o r y ,An Imperial Message suggests
the hopelessness of the subjective-self ever reaching
the audience by means of words, or the narrative-text:
Despite the King’s messenger’s athletic efforts to deli-
ver the message from the dying king to you, the reader,
“. . . s t i l lh ei so n l ym a k i n gh i sw a yt h r o u g ht h ec h a m b e r s
of the innermost palace; never will he get to the end of
t h e m .. . .B u ty o us i ta ty o u rw i n d o ww h e ne v e n i n gf a l l s
and dream it to yourself” [ 1 0 ] ,p .5 ,m ye m p h a s e s .T h e
writer and his audience have only language to convey
subjective-experiences. With its presumably common
neurobiological mechanisms, dreaming, transcends the
division between minds encapsulated by their respec-
tive physical-bodies, but remains - as Binswanger
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thus, “you... dream it to yourself” [10]. Kafka’si m a g e r y
symbolizes the structure of self as a process of self-
transcendence which is condemned to remain incom-
plete or partial. The child-ghost in Unhappiness refers
to the process of symbolic self-transformation through
the hypnagogic image as reborn (a child) but also one
which first requires a symbolic death (the ghost).
Previously, I have written that narrative enables heal-
ing of trauma by a process of self-transcendence [18].
The subjective self splits into an “I” who narrates the
experiences of a “me” who is, in turn, embedded in the
unfolding scenes of the narrative. That is, the narrating
“I” is both same and different than the “me” it surpasses
in each narrative act. One’s self - as totality in the
ongoing switching but connecting between
(unconscious) body schema and (conscious) body image
- eludes conscious awareness but also makes the
transcendence of the (painful) past possible. As I have
indicated elsewhere, the ongoing switching between
body-schema (agentic I) and body-image (social me)
may be mapped onto underlying neural pathways (i.e,
an ongoing shifting between egocentric and allocentric
reference frames [2,3,9]).
Narrative is the ability to frame imaginary time within
real time. By focusing and narrowing the audience’so r
even the narrator’s attention on scenes in imaginary
time (i.e., away from the present context of embodied-
sensory experiencing), narrative induces a trancelike
state. The anthropologist Levi-Straus [63] describes the
shaman’s practice of placing a tuft of down into his
mouth, biting his own tongue and then spitting out the
bloody feather as if it were the pathological “foreign
body” extracted from the patient. To cure the patient,
he places the patient and the surrounding audience into
a trance but, like the narrator, he must put himself into
the same trance, i.e., somehow believe his own “perfor-
mance,” to be convincing.
Narrative entrancement (i.e., trance-like absorption or
‘attentional captivation’ in what is currently being por-
trayed) is common to all the arts, including performance
and visual arts where language is not the primary
experience. This ability is thought to have emerged pre-
linguistically during the period of homo erectus by
means of what Donald [64] calls “mimetic culture,” i.e.,
the ability to tell stories through gesture and dance
before language abilities evolved. Whether the details of
Donald’s account of cognitive evolution turn out to be
correct is not critical to the current argument. Here I
wish only to emphasize the human body’s ability to dou-
ble itself in mimetic narrative as both the current body
expressing and the symbolic (pantomimed) content it
refers to (e.g., one’s own body crawling like the panther).
This occurs in the trance-like context of the narrative
and is a very early form of experiencing the embodied
self from both internal and external viewpoints, i.e., as
d o u b l e d[ 9 ] .W h e nw es p e a k ,g e s t u r e ,o rw r i t e ,w ea r e
simultaneously recipients, witnesses, of our own com-
municative efforts. We hear our own voice and partially
see our bodily gestures. That is, we take an external,
doubled-perspective on ourselves to communicate with
others [9]. The questions remain: How does our experi-
ence of body enable us to double the self symbolically in
narrative? Moreover, how is this symbolic doubling pro-
cess of bodily self exemplified in Kafka’ss t o r i e sw h i c h
recount hypnagogic autoscopic images of a Doppelgän-
ger?T ow h a te x t e n td o e st h i sp r o c e s sa l s oh e l pu s
understand disruption of self in neuropsychiatric disor-
ders [3]?
Kafka, Phenomenology and Reflective Awareness
of Self as Double
Through attending lectures by Brentano’s
xxviii students
in Prague (Anton Marty, Christian von Ehrenfels), Kafka
was familiar with the phenomenological movement or at
least some of its principles. Nevertheless, he was skepti-
cal about any effort to observe and put subjective
experience into words: “There is no such thing as obser-
vation of the inner world, as there is of the outer
w o r l d . . .T h ei n n e rw o r l dc a no n l yb ee x p e r i e n c e d ,n o t
described” (Kafka [65], p. 72). Kafka [46] writes in a let-
ter, “For words are poor mountain climbers and poor
miners. They do not fetch the treasures from the moun-
tain tops nor those from the mountains’ depths” (p. 9,
my translation). Kafka’s frequent use of metaphors of
mining or digging into/merging with the earth is both a
symbol of searching the “inner depths” of self, only
poorly achieved through the use of reflection and words,
but also the wish for rebirth through descent into the
‘underworld’[1].
Kafka’ss t o r yThe Bridge portrays an insurmountable
gap between reflective-verbal description and its pre-
reflective “stream” of consciousness. The narrator
i n f o r m su st h a th ei sab r i d g e ,s p a n n i n ga na b y s s
(Abgrund). His body, which is “stiff and cold,” suggests
an inanimate state. It is nevertheless alive in that his fin-
gers and feet clutch, as if with unflinching “bite” (festge-
bissen)i n t ot h e“crumbling clay” of the two sides
spanning the abyss [10], p. 411. Located at impassable
heights, he stretches over a noisy, icy stream of trout
flowing past “in the depths.” As evening approaches
(the time of twilight mental-states, as in Unhappiness),
t h eb r i d g ei sconfused. “The roar of the stream had
grown deeper” (as suggested above, in the multimodal
hypnagogic state [3,56]). Then, a person walks, jumps
on the bridge: “Who was it? A child? A dream? A way-
farer? A suicide? ... And I turned around so as to see
him. A bridge turn around?” By turning around, the
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ered (aufgespießt) by the rocks of the rushing stream
(i.e., the self’s own depths). When the bridge turns back
to reflect (from its lofty heights) on the its own passing
stream of consciousness, the self that just was, the cor-
poreal “me” that the reflective “I” attempts to capture in
the reflection, is lost and destroyed in the process.
At first this sounds in direct contradiction to Husserl’s
phenomenology, but there are surprising points of
agreement. Husserl attempts to found phenomenology
as a reflective science of consciousness on human sub-
jectivity, which has its own latent-functional structures
that enable, i.e., make possible, the conscious experience
of meaning. As a result, the portal of all subjective
experience and meaning is the present moment.H o w -
ever, when Husserl attempts to found his philosophy on
this “now,” he finds himself in considerable difficulty.
Every reflection on a now is itself subsequent to what it
reflects and, like Kafka’s bridge, human subjectivity col-
lapses before the reflection ever reaches it. Husserl
agrees that we do not have immediate reflective aware-
ness of the streaming consciousness as it is occurring.
Reflection is always subsequent, after the fact. In the
story, A Bridge,a si nThe Burrow, the achievement of a
double-perspective on oneself through reflection or (ret-
rospective) self-observation (in time) ultimately fails [2].
Reflecting on oneself presupposes a splitting of the “I”
(Ichspaltung) into an currently thinking or reflecting “I”
and a reflected (already past!) “me” ( H u s s e r l ,[ 5 8 ] ;s e e
below).
In this paper, I examine Husserl’sp h e n o m e n o l o g yo f
self only to the extent it addresses the problem of the
symbolic duplication of self in hypnagogic hallucination
(for more extensive review, see [48]). I have indicated
that Husserl attempts to found all conscious experience
on an abstract now (the living present), which occurs so
“rapidly” (so far as an abstraction may be said to occur
at all), that it is not directly available to experience or
reflection (except precisely as an abstraction).
xxix Criti-
cally, the now of the “living present” (and its hidden
absolute transcendental “functioning” subjectivity) can
only be accessed by means of metaphoric description
because the abstract “now” is itself “ambiguous” (Held
[66], p. 77): the I as subject is both “standing” (persisting
in the now) and “streaming” (disappearing into a past).
Note that the verbal descriptions of consciousness as
“standing” and “streaming” are metaphoric. Thus, the
self experiences a ‘rebirth’ with each new present upsurge
which passes off as retention into the “night of the
unconscious,” where it suffers a death (a shrouding over
of the retention as it disappears into the past as a “hori-
zon of clouding over” (Vernebelungshorizont). It may be
“reawoken” or brought back to life as memory in the
present consciousness but this new memory itself passes
off again to its own death in the streaming conscious-
ness (Husserl [67]; Mishara [68]). Husserl asks, how can
the living present be both streaming and standing in ori-
ginal (self-transcending) unity? How can it be both
“alive” (in the present) and “dead” as a self already past
housing mere ghosts or shades in an underworld
[67,68], who, presumably, haunt the present self, for
example, as (symbolic) doubles in hypnagogic
experience?
We find ourselves in the paradox that the source or
fundament of all conscious experience is an abstract
now moment, which is itself non-experienceable. Simi-
larly to W. James’ metaphoric description of the present
as a melting snowflake, it has already passed in our very
becoming conscious of it. The self is an emergent but
passive-associative developing of itself (passiv-azzociative
Sich-von-Selbst-Entfalten) in the ongoing self-displacing
as a standing in the streaming nows. Husserl [69], p. 53.
My own subjective living is both the loss of self as sub-
ject I just was (now a past me, “split” off from the pre-
sent moment as the self’s double) and the emergence of
the I anew (a rebirth) in the current moment. That is,
self as a surpassing of itself with each new now moment
is a process of rebirth in which I must paradoxically let
go of me myself (now a double or past self “sinking” into
the horizon of the past or “subterranean underworld of
the unconscious” [67,68]) in order to become myself
anew as the I who persists (von Weizsäcker [53]).
xxx The
I persists as self-displacing, “functioning” center of its
own living present, as “standing” (embedded, embodied)
in its own “streaming” [66-68]. In these descriptions, the
use of metaphor (which we have seen to be ‘necessary’
in such descriptions) itself becomes an instantiation of
its own self-transcending (i.e, by making use of its own
indirect, and initially unconscious, reflexive self-refer-
ence [2,3,47-49,62]. As we will further examine, this is
precisely how the hypnagogic hallucination or hypnago-
gic dream image takes on autosymbolic meaning [47]).
When controlled conscious processing relaxes, meta-
phoric images of self arise spontaneously (e.g., hypnago-
gic images, spontaneous metaphors in narratives)
[18,47]. These reflect the self in its dual movement in
time as advancing towards the future and letting go of
the past, what Husserl calls “I move myself” as the core
of self-transcendence in time [2,6]. Binswanger [62]
observes that self-transcendence (the “I move myself”)i s
the condition for the ability to distance from one’sc u r -
rent experience. Moreover, the ability to transcend one’s
current perspective is compromised in acute psychosis
as well as during dreaming and other anomalous (e.g.,
hallucinatory) conscious states. Schizophrenia patients
delusionally refer to themselves in inhuman or “thing-
like” terms, e.g., as a “machine,”“ computer” or “appara-
tus” whose sole function is to “register” impressions
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is nevertheless an implicit way of preserving (minimal)
self in its compromised ability to transcend the current
experience but, at the same time, preserves a distance
(no matter how minimally) by enabling the patient to
describe metaphorically, and thus transcend the experi-
ence by use of metaphor (no matter how concretely
interpreted) [2,3,62]. That is, the delusional metaphor of
self as a “registering apparatus” spontaneously refers to
the underlying process of self-transcendence, but only in
an unconsciously reflexive manner, which makes such
metaphoric-symbolic doubling of self first possible (as
in Silberer’s “autosymbolism” [47], but see also
[2-4,48,49,62]).
We experience our consciousness as an obligatory dis-
placing itself with each new now. Nevertheless, we do
not have reflective access to this process which is funda-
mentally self [6]. As Husserl writes, “the streaming is
always ahead (im voraus)...” Any representation of self is
already past (having a self), with its own closure. Self as
process of self-transcendence is reflected in Sartre’s [39]
famous phrase, “existence precedes essence” where
essence - my self as representation or object - (citing
Hegel) is “what is already past": “Wesen ist, was gewesen
ist“ [70]. Sartre [69] had identified consciousness with
boundless freedom, a nothingness– a metaphoric “knife-
blade"–which is condemned to continually sever itself
from what it just was. Consciousness has to cede each
image or representation of itself as already surpassed by
the next now-perspective (and its initially open prospec-
tive vulnerability to a not yet known future [25]) which
replaces it. Self as a process of self-transcendence means
that I replace each experience of myself as body as
object (the allocentric coordinates of a body-image
embedded in retrospective scene-based episodic narra-
tive memories) with the prospective openness to the
not-yet-known, the body as subject (the egocentric
frame of reference of an on line, anticipatory body-
schema, see [3,25], and below).
In a similar manner, Husserl’s phenomenology of self
points to a “doubling” (Entzweiung), or self-dividing of
time consciousness [48]. The self-dividing necessary for
the memory of a past self is a self-displacing totality,
which nevertheless remains hidden to itself in its con-
necting of past and present selves. Metaphors in narra-
tives of self (including Husserl’s own descriptions of the
self as both “standing” and “streaming”)t h e m s e l v e s
become, as we have seen, instantiations of the self’so w n
self-transcending and thus, its inevitable doubling
[2,3,18,48]. Because consciousness is experienced as a
“field” or “horizonal” experience with its own back-
ground, we are not simultaneously aware of the totality
of self that we are as it passes with each new now
moment in its successive syntheses of transition
(Überganssynthese) between now-points [66-68]. Never-
theless, we symbolize this totality of self indirectly (pars
pro toto) and unconsciously in hypnagogic autosymbo-
lism and the hallucination of doubles.
In a recent publication [48], I indicate that Husserl’s
phenomenology of self involves a doubling, or self-divid-
ing (Entzweiung) of time consciousness (as a self-displa-
cing totality). Husserl requires this doubling to account
for how we can have a memory of a past self in the pre-
sent. In Husserl’s terms, whenever we remember some-
thing, the memory occurs in the present but refers to a
past that transcends this present. That is, each past
memory is not only itself (its own “self-givenness”)b u t
also part (Mitglied)o falarger transcendent totality, the
past. The past continues to “enrich itself” (sich stetig
bereichendes) or expand with each new experience up to
the present (Husserl [67], p. 207). As such the past is
both immanent to present consciousness in making
available individual memories that occur at the
moment, but also a transcendent “realm of Being in
itself,” a hidden unity, which any particular remember-
ing presupposes and refers to [48,67,68]. The phenomen-
ological self is both the kinesthetic-noetic orienting to an
emergent affective saliency in its own field but also the
totality, which transcends the current moment. That is, it
is both the living present and the transcendent past as
one totality of streaming consciousness.
As we have seen, the self as the totality of the stream-
ing consciousness is both the present moment and the
transcendent past. Any present moment passes off as
retention into this “underworld of the unconscious.”
xxx
However, we must also appeal to this same unconscious
to retrieve any past now in a recollection. The past (as
immanent “object”) is continuously instituted anew in
the present (immer neue Urstiftung in sich vollzieht), but
as precisely that which transcends the present as its own
realm of Being.
xxxi However, it is through this same past
that streaming consciousness constitutes itself as “true
Being” (wahres Sein)( ibid.) and to which we owe the
“idea of a true self“ (die Idee eines wahren Selbst).
“Before any activity of the I,” consciousness “objectifes”
itself as past, as no longer I but a retrospective me (Hus-
serl [67], p. 210). Paradoxically, the self as the streaming
totality is transcendent to present consciousness as its
past, but also, in a way that remains hidden, is also this
present consciousness.
xxxii
In conclusion, the connection between current and
past self is only possible through the retention (of the just
past present) disappearing, it’s being covered over by the
empty retention [67,68], by the unconscious relationship
between present and past selves as a self-transcending,
or self-dividing, a doubling (Entzweiung). That is, to be
both present self and remembered past self, we remain
unconscious of their relationship which remains a
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and now of the currently affective present, or the pre-
sent episodic, narrative remembering of what is now
past [48].
xxxiii
The Body doubles as Symbolic Self
The view I have presented here is in direct contradiction
to the French, theologically minded phenomenologist,
Michel Henry. The latter has served as a source for
recent efforts which attempt, erroneously I believe, to
base contemporary neuroscientific concepts of subjectiv-
ity on Henry’s concept of self as pre-reflective self-
awareness. Because this approach, as Henry himself,
wants to leap over the accumulated methods and
insights of the phenomenological tradition, but in a way
that claims putative ties with this tradition, I have called
this approach neo-phenomenology [6,71].
xxxiv Despite
more recent efforts by the neophenomenologists to graft
Henry’s approach onto Husserl and other phenomenolo-
gists, Henry’s own work stands outside the tradition of
phenomenology, even counter to it.
Henry [72,6] proposes that pre-reflective self-aware-
ness, what he identifies with passive auto-affection, is
the manifestation of self to itself in its own immediate
feeling of life. For Henry, this is the givenness of the
subject to itself in the radical passivity or immanence of
“auto-affection.” That is, Henry’s concept of self (as sub-
jective body given to itself in radical immanence as life)
presupposes in its one-sidedness precisely the opposition
between subject and object and thus - despite hand-
waving protests to the contrary by his adherents -
remains trapped within the 19
th century methodologic
oppositions outlined in the beginning of this paper.
Henry [74] writes: “there is laid bare a first dimension
of experience in which what must be understood as the
ground of the psyche experiences itself in radical imme-
diacy, before any ‘relation to an ob-ject,’ prior to the
arising of the world and independently of it” (p. 160).
Or: “An immanent revelation which is a presence to
itself... understood as an original revelation which is
accomplished I a sphere of radical immanence [that]
exists by itself, without any real context, [and] without
t h es u p p o r to fa n ye x t e r i o ra n d‘real’ Being” [ 7 2 ] ,p .4 1 .
Similarly, Henry describes a “radical phenomenology,
capable of discerning at the very heart of pure appear-
ance and in the phenomenality of the visible a more
profound dimension where life attains itself before the
advent of the world...” [ 7 5 ] ,p .3 .T h a ti s ,b o d i l ys u b j e c -
tivity “knows” itself as life, incarnation, without needing
to take the detour of mediation in externality, temporal-
ity, embodiment, otherness or intersubjectivity.
Critical for the current argument, Henry [73-75] cri-
tiques the Freudian unconscious as being both a product
of, but also lying outside the “metaphysics of
representation.” It is rather the “body” as alive, as mani-
festing itself to itself in complete self-awareness (and
thus, not an unconscious at all). Here, self is given to
itself in the immediacy of life feeling itself; there is no
gap between self and its own autoaffection as the instan-
tiation of being alive at the moment, an interiority
immediately intimate (i.e., without distance) with itself.
He [74] proposes that the problem of ultimate ground-
ing rests with the structure of appearing itself in that all
intentionality refers back to the ecstatic appearing in
which it itself unfolds. Rather, the concept of ipseity,
xxxv
and its neophenomenological, appropriation as passive
self-affection (or so-called pre-reflective self-awareness)
is ultimately a matter of faith. It is theological: “Through
its phenomenological essence-because it is thereby truth,
pure manifestation, revelation-the Life of which Chris-
tianity speaks differs totally from what biology studies.
....Since the coming-into-itself of life is its coming into
the ‘experience-of-itself’...it follows that this enjoyment
of self, this ‘feeling of oneself’ is the first form of any
conceivable phenomenality.... This identity between
experiencing and what is experienced is original essence
of Ipseity.” (Henry [76], pp. 34, 56). Similarly, Henry
writes (which will have more meaning when we consider
his theory of the ontology of the body as “absolute sub-
jectivity”): “T h ep o w e r so fm yb o d yd on o t ,t h e r e f o r e ,
give me the being of the world except on the condition
of being known in a knowledge where the concept of
the world plays no role whatsoever... The body is pre-
sent to us in the absolute immanence of subjectivity”
[73], p. 93-4.
In his phenomenological analysis of the subjective
body as immediately given to itself as autoaffection, the
French phenomenological thinker Henry [73] observes
that the “subjective body” ( a si ti sg i v e nt oi m m a n e n c e )
and its objective “representation” (the “constituted
body”) in its scientific study as object to be “two bodies.”
He asks how can these two bodies be in any way con-
nected or experienced as one: “why do we not have a
single body, but, so to speak,t w ob o d i e s ,o ri fy o up r e -
fer, why does the being of our body split into an origin-
ally subjective being and transcendent being...?” [73],
p. 115. However, I experience both bodies as “mine,”
“w h i c hc a u s e st h i sb e i n gt ob eg i v e nt om et w i c e ”
(Henry [73], p. 115).
xxxvi
Henry’s answers that it is only because we are able to
experience the body as doubled in this way that we are
able to have symbolic language or signification. Henry
writes, “Solely the development of these views could
lead, in our opinion, to a satisfactory theory of symbo-
lism” [73], p. 92. That is, the relation between the lived
body as subject and its double is “symbolic.” Note that
this is a variant of what we have already said with regard
to Donald’st h e s i s( d e s c r i b e da b o v e )t h a tw ea r eo n l y
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the body is able to double itself mimetically in telling
stories, even if these narratives were at first non-verbal
but only public performance. However, it is precisely at
this point, despite this momentary reconciliation, that
we must part company with Henry. The unity between
sensing and moving is not, as Henry proposes, given as
absolute knowledge or complete coincidence in imma-
nent self-awareness (of an exclusively subjective body
given directly and immediately to itself) but remains the
“hidden unity” of the subject in terms of a Gestalt-circle
(Gestaltkreis) between perception and movement (von
Weizsäcker [53,77]).
xxxvii
Following von Weizsacker’s insights, Merleau-Ponty
[78] describes the famous example of the inseparability
of the two kinds of bodily experience - body as subject
and body as object - in the oft-cited “double sensation”
thought experiment. In this “experiment” one of my
hands touches the other hand (which, in turn, touches
some third object in the world): “My left hand is always
on the verge of touching my right hand touching the
things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence
eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two
things always occurs: either my right hand really passes
over to the rank of touched, but then its hold on the
world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world
and I do not really touch it - my right hand touching, I
palpate with my left hand it’s outer covering.” (Merleau-
Ponty [78], pp. 147-8). I may, at will, alternatively inha-
bit each of the two complementary attitudes. However,
the moment I actively touch my right hand with my left
hand, my right hand becomes its object (something
touched) and loses its active status. The moment my
right hand resumes its active role touching the object, I
no longer experience its being touched. Despite Henry’s
claims for an “absolute unity” putatively given in pre-
reflective self-awareness (but somehow also accessible to
verbalized reflection) between affecting and affected as
the “pure” immanence of passive self-affection, we see
that the human embodied relationship to self is better
characterized as a “hidden unity,” a Gestalt-kreis as
ongoing self-transcendence, in which the active and pas-
sive attitudes to my own touching are mutually
exclusive.
In a manner which integrates both von Weizsäcker’s
concept of Gestalt-circle and the neurologic opposition
body schema/body image, Merleau-Ponty [78] writes: By
means of ‘’reversibility . . .alone, there is passage from
the ‘’for itself’’ to the ‘’for the Other’’ (i.e., from body for
self to the body for others). He adds: ‘’There is not the
For Itself and For the Other. They are each the other
side of the other.’’ (p. 263). ‘’The body sensed and the
body sentient are the obverse and the reverse ...a st w o
segments of one sole circular course. . . which is but
o n es o l em o v e m e n ti np h a s e s . ’’ (p. 138, my emphasis).
Henry proposes an isolated subjectivity immanent to its
own body, yet the moment we are conscious of being/
having a body, we are already inextricably related to
others and a world. Contra Henry, there can be no self
without another as its converse, its other side. Our only
path to ourselves is through embodiment, which includes
the other in ourselves (for which we have also found neu-
roscientific evidence (see above)), a Gestalt-circle of self-
transcendence as (reversible) being in the world [62],
what Merleau-Ponty [78] calls “flesh.”
Operative hyper-reflexivity and the myth of the
Apollonian
Adopting Henry’s concepts, proponents of the hyper-
reflexivity model of schizophrenia claim that a pre-
reflective or operative “hyper-reflexivity” compensates
for the “diminishment” of selfness in pre-reflective self-
awareness (ipseity, or passive auto-affection). Here, phe-
nomenologic method is putatively implemented to
describe the first person perspective as “pre-reflectively
self-aware.” That is, the first person perspective is
assumed to be the same as “pre-reflectively self-aware-
ness.” Since I discuss this approach and the current
debate in detail elsewhere [6,71], I present an abbre-
viated account only to the extent that it is pertinent to
the current discussion.
A major proponent of this approach, Zahavi asserts
that, whenever I experience anything, there is a conco-
mitant (tacit) self-awareness. Experience is given as
experienced in a first-person manner in which prereflec-
tive self-awareness need only be co-conscious (mitbe-
wusst). The first-person perspective is always present
because all experiences are infused (at least tacitly) with
the quality of “mineness”: “Any experience that lacks
self-awareness is nonconscious.” That is, consciousness of
experience is synonymous with mineness or having a
first-person perspective. Because what makes the experi-
ence a conscious experience is by definition the mine-
ness of its (implicit) first-person perspective, it exhibits
the principle of ‘immunity to error through misidentifi-
cation’ (for review, see Mishara [6]).
Given the tenuousness of Henry’s position, however, it
is puzzling that these thinkers, who identify themselves
as phenomenologists, should base their entire approach
on concepts, which clearly go beyond what phenomeno-
logical method is able to study. We are reminded of
Husserl’s [69] own admonition: “"One falls so easily into
the mistake of being abstract” (p. 350, my translation).
For reasons which rest in the phenomenology itself,t h e
concepts of pre-reflective self-awareness, and its atten-
dant “operative hyper-reflectivity,” ap o s i t i o nt h a tIh a v e
labeled neo-phenomenology [6,71],
xxxviii are, in principle,
NOT accessible in terms of 1) phenomeonlogic
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with pre-reflective self-awareness:
1) Phenomenological method is a stepwise method
of reflecting on experience.
xxxix Since reflection is
inevitably retrospective to the experience it reflects
on, it is not able to access the putative pre-reflective
self awareness without knowing whether reflection
itself has transformed the experience, or inserted the
very “results” it is looking for.
xl As a result, argu-
ments for this construct are indirect, abstract and
ultimately, vacuous.
xli
2) The methods of neuroscience are only able to
measure subjective processes and experiences in
terms of the subject’s responses (verbal, non-verbal,
neural). These inevitably involve a “delay” in real
time between the experience and the response. Even
so-called more direct measurements of neural
‘responses’ (e.g., fMRI, PET, EEG) inevitably involve
a temporal-artifactual delay between what occurs in
the brain and the preferred method for measuring it.
There is no experimental access to this putative con-
struct which supposedly “constrains” the very
method which is unable to test it.
xlii Therefore, the
construct cannot be established in phenomenological
reflection nor falsified with scientific method, and
thus not able, as its proponents claim, to “constrain”
neuroscience. There is the liability when reflecting
on one’s own experience that one becomes overly
attached to one’s own constructs. Husserl’s phenom-
enological injunction, “back to the things them-
selves,” should serve as sobering antidote.
With the recent openness in cognitive and clinical
neuroscience to studying the so-called “first person per-
spective,” it is understandable that neo-phenomenologi-
cal proponents would want to rush in quickly with bold
assertions about being able access to first person knowl-
edge to fill this need - or rather, what really is and
remains an explanatory gap (see Mishara [9]). Once
maneuvering themselves into a plausible position
imparted to the scientific community at large, but in an
esoteric language that only few understand, they defend
their pseudo-occupancy of this gap. As I contend in
more detail elsewhere, their very efforts to do so, how-
ever, precipitously resulted in the assertion of a series of
vacuous concepts incapable of being verified (e.g., ipse-
ity, operative hyper-reflectivity, psychosis as “solipsism,”
t h ea b i l i t yt o“explain schizophrenia” with non-testable
constructs, the abstract and artificial separation of a
“pure” qualitativeness from its inextricable relation to
the quantitative in everyday cognition (see [53], and
below), and finally, the ability to study the schizophrenia
patient’s subjective experience of negative signs (by
definition not directly experienced by the patient but
only observable to the clinician) through the ’self-reports’
of Artaud’s literary writings, see [71]). It is curious that
the neophenomenological adherents have elected to pri-
vilege precisely those constructs, which cannot, in prin-
ciple, be directly studied either by phenomenological or
scientific method. As a result, the constructs appear not
to be useful in both their application to the psycho-
pathology of neuropsychiatric disorders/anomalous con-
scious states (including hypnagogic hallucinations as
discussed in this contribution), and their neuroscientific
study. To the extent that the concept of “operative
hyper-reflexivity,” and its counterpart, ipseity (pre-reflec-
tive self-awareness as autoaffection in the sense of
Henry) cannot be verified by phenomenologic method,
nor falsified by neuroscientific experimental method,
they have - although it is always possible that my assess-
ment is incorrect - limited usefulness in the diagnosis,
treatment and/or research of schizophrenia.
To summarize the argument so far: Neophenomenol-
ogy claims “phenomenological descriptions, including
pre-reflective self-awareness “must” act as constraining
conditions for any neuroscientific explanation’ of psy-
chiatric disorders” (my emphasis, see Mishara [6], for
direct quotation). Regardless of whether the claim of
constraint is meant in a strong or weak sense, as it
appears the neophenomenologists shift their position,
now denying their previously strong claims, see [71],
this claim of necessity ("must”)e r r so nt w oc o u n t s :1 )
Since phenomenological descriptions are only possible
through the phenomenologic reflective method, the con-
struct pre-reflective self awareness is not available to
this method; 2) the phenomenological method does not
yield “final” results which could be taken wholesale by
other approaches, especially neuroscience which pro-
ceeds by completely different methods.
There is the related problem that our measurement of
conscious experience or other cognitive and neural pro-
cesses occurs, by definition, in the real time of neural
events. That is, the experimental method is only able to
access the subject’s experience of self in terms of the sub-
ject’sr e s p o n s e s . There is no way to directly study pre-
reflective self-awareness without probing the subject to
elicit a response, and a response requires a delay in real
time, and thus the preclusion of naïve immediacy in
Henry’s sense. While it is possible to study pre-reflective
self experimentally [6], e.g., priming studies, or even
reflectively, as I propose in the current contribution, it
is not possible, in principle, to directly study pre-reflec-
tive self-awareness as any intervention (phenomenologi-
cal or experimental) to access such self-awareness
through the subject’s verbal reports would require that
the subject be reflectively aware, in a now shifted atti-
tude, of what he supposedly experienced pre-reflectively.
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work activity, or resting state, are equally helpless in
accessing pre-reflective self-awareness as any post-scan-
ning debriefing about what the subject experienced dur-
ing the “cognitively unconstrained” or “daydreaming”
default mode activity, requires the subject to respond
verbally and reflectively to her previous, putatively “pre-
reflective” experience. Moreover, the tenuous equation
of ipseity with fMRI default mode activity (as proposed
by the neophenomenologists) is invalid due to a host of
additional methodical problems [71]). So-called front-
loading the experimental subject with phenomenologic
reflective skills (as implemented by Lutz and colleagues
in so-called neurophenomenological experimental stu-
dies) also does nothing to alleviate this methodologic
problem of only being able to access the putative con-
structs through the subject’s verbal or other responses.
That is, the subject is only able to reflective-verbally
report that which is accessible to a reflective attitude -
thus requiring a shift in experiencing with different
neural circuitry from the pre-reflective experience puta-
tively contained in such reports. As the above claims of
direct, “absolute” reflective access to pre-reflective self-
awareness, such “front-loading” stands in danger of con-
founding its results with a “verbal overshadowing” effect
[71]. We also know that even the slightest change of
attitude from non-reflective to reflective as in the simple
paradim “refresh” (developed in Marcia Johnson’sl a b ,
Yale University) requires the recruiting of entirely new
networks of the brain. This indicates that even the sim-
plest reflection on our experience requires a different cog-
nitive attitude (as Husserl himself repeatedly
emphasized) and different neural processes subserving
this attitude.
Conversely, the phenomenology of the internal con-
sciousness of time has a host of opposite methodological
problems. It is performed in the subject’s reflection. Its
results are abstract and provisional to the type of phe-
nomenological “reduction” performed and the ongoing
refinement from further reductions which may abstrac-
tively isolate this or another layer of experiencing. While
the phenomenological researcher may report on the
abstracted components of subjective time-consciousness,
as they have been isolated verbally according to the
step-wise method recounted above, the content of these
reports cannot itself be directly measured in real time
by means of the subject’s motor, verbal or neural
responses. What neophenomenology apparently overlooks
in its effort to fill the explanatory gap is that attempts to
link the phenomenology of subjective experience with the
real time conditions of conscious experience (accessed
experimentally) can only be related in terms of a
Gestalt-circle (Gestaltkreis) (von Weizsäcker [53]). That
is, each approach presupposes but also methodologically
excludes its complement as two sides of the same coin.
Hence, the privileged neo-phenomenological constructs
(e.g., pre-reflective self-awareness as ipseity, or “opera-
tive hyper-reflexivity”) are themselves untestable and
thus, nonfalsifiable. Their claim that they are able to
directly “constrain,” or even contribute to neuroscience
in any way at all, without first providing concepts which
are capable of being formed into testable hypotheses, is
at best naïve. The neophenomenologic ongoing evident
refusal to enter into constructive debate betrays the
inhering vulnerability of their position by adopting what
I have labeled an “emperor new clothes” strategy (See
Mishara [3,6,71]).
The neophenomenological position is that a dimen-
sion of “mineness” (or a passive auto-affection) pervades
all conscious experience by virtue of being conscious
(see [6]). It is therefore a pervasive quality of conscious-
ness that cannot be directly measured, and thus not dis-
sociable from consciousness itself. Sass repeatedly
argues that the “diminishment” of pre-reflective self-
awareness or passive self-affection in schizophrenia, i.e.,
“ipseity” (or selfness) is strictly qualitative and holistic,
and therefore not captured by the usual ways of quanti-
tatively diagnosing the signs and symptoms of schizo-
phrenia. As we will examine, the failure to conceptually
separate “diminished ipseity” from its “increased hyper-
reflexivity” contributes to its vagueness and the barriers
to studying it either phenomenologically or
neuroscientifically.
To review, Sass proposes that an operative, pre-reflec-
tive or automatic “hyper-reflectivity” (which, as I will
explain, is both self-contradictory and implausible at
least in the terms of the neuroscience) compensates for
the “diminishment” of selfness (ipseity) in pre-reflective
self-awareness in schizophrenia. Sass bases his use of
the term “operational hyper-reflexivity” on an explicit
analogy with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “operational
intentionality,” to mean “tacitly” or automatically func-
tioning. However, it is not clear to what extent hyper-
reflexivity may be considered similar enough to the phe-
nomenological concept of “intentionality” to justify the
analogy. Sass’ idea is that hyper-reflexivity (or exagger-
ated self-reflection) may itself become automatic in
schizophrenia leading to the ‘’pop out’’ of irrelevant
background stimuli during early psychosis. However,
Sass’ efforts to find support for his neophenomenologi-
cal concepts of ipseity and operative hyper-reflexivity in
neuroscientific research (e.g., gamma band coherence,
Gray’s comparator model, perceptual pop out, default
mode activity) are based on vague analogies which
appear (in my view) not to understand the original neu-
roscience (see [71]).
Since ipseity is non-dissociable from consciousness,
then compensatory hyper-reflexivity must be
Mishara Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:13
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/13
Page 19 of 37unconscious, automatic or what the neophenomenolo-
gists call “tacit.” While the compensation of diminished
selfness in prereflective self-awareness by means of an
increase in pre-reflective hyper-reflectivity sounds like it
is a quantitative relationship, Sass and his co-author,
Parnas insist that they are describing holistic transfor-
mations of subjective experience that cannot be cap-
tured quantitatively and in fact cannot be really
separated from one another.T h a ti s ,ipseity and auto-
matic hyper-reflexivity are really the same.
These claims of being able to separate quality from
quantity in our pre-reflective naïve experiencing in a
manner proposed to “constrain” neuroscience - without
being testable according to neuroscience’s own methods -
just perpetuate the divide between the human and nat-
ural sciences (as outlined in the introduction). Viktor
von Weizsäcker [53] the phenomenological clinician and
sense-physiologist, regarded as the founder of psychoso-
matic medicine in Germany, argues that quality and
quantity are inextricably interwoven in dialectical rela-
tionship (i.e., Gestaltkreis)f r o mt h ev e r yb e g i n n i n g si n
our everyday cognition and the earliest levels of neural
processing of a perception o ram o v e m e n t( s e e[ 7 1 ] ) .
That is, on the level of naïve experiencing, every quali-
tative description is at least implicitly a quantitative
description. Any particular experience of a perceptual,
or feeling quality is implicitly also one of degree of
intensity, volume, pervasiveness, etc. That is, on this
level, although mutually exclusive as abstractions,t h e
two terms, quality and quantity, mutually presuppose
one another in inextricable interweaving (Verschraen-
kung) according to the revolving door principle of a
Gestalt-circle [53]. All this is merely to indicate that the
divisive separation of the human sciences (liberal arts, as
in the study of literature) and the natural scientific
study of the brain is not overcome, but rather exacer-
bated by neophenomenology’s facile assertions which, in
fact, cannot be supported by human science, natural
science or phenomenological approaches (see Figure. 1).
Despite claiming that the relationship is not “quantita-
tive” in that the concepts are too “holistic” and inter-
related, Sass and Parnas nevertheless contradict them-
selves in proposing, by virtue of the very words they
use, a quantitative relationship between decreased or
diminished self-affection and increased reflexivity
(hyper-reflexivity) or reflective self-awareness. That is,
they propose a standard inverse correlational relation-
ship. However, the increased or excessive reflective self-
awareness is pre-reflective, or passively automatic, like
ipseity itself. Since ipseity pervades pre-reflective self-
consciousness and is thus not dissociable from con-
sciousness, it is itself virtually indistinguishable from its
compensatory operative hyper-reflexive response. We
find ourselves in such a quagmire of nebulous terms
and concepts that amorphously flow into one another.
The possibility of being able to operationalize and mea-
sure these constructs according to neuroscientific meth-
ods is prohibited from the outset.
Sass and Parnas [79] write: “hyper-reflexivity and
transformation of ipseity may ...not be best conceived as
outcomes or indices of distinct processes, but as aspects
of a single whole ...Indeed it may be argued that these
two disturbances are really one and the same phenom-
enon...” (p. 79). This failure to conceptually distinguish
parts of a process which could be defined precisely,
remain stable, and eventually be operationalized is
indeed a recipe for somewhat esoteric terms, which are
difficult to understand and operationalize. The terms do
not seem to have any direct applicability in the under-
standing, research and treatment of patients who suffer
from a very real disorder. Moreover, since these con-
cepts remain sufficiently vague, they may always be
reformulated to include those aspects considered lacking
by critics. The authors could offer the counter-argu-
ment, “Mishara misunderstands, this is what we meant
all along.” As a result, they present a moving but also
ultimately, amorphous target (see Mishara [6,71]). By
abstractly and reflectively separating “quality” from
“quantity” in a manner which does not appear in the
original phenomenological experience (see von Weiz-
saecker, [53]), Sass exhibits some bias to elevate the
qualitative over the quantitative and ultimately, may fail
to be able to reintegrate these assumptions back into
scientific study. This is reflected in numerous state-
ments; for example, Sass writes: “...the characteristically
schizophrenic abnormalities of experience defy any sim-
ple quantitative description and demand a richer and
more qualitative set of concepts” (see Mishara [71]). By
restricting their assertions to the qualitative, neopheo-
menological adherents are always able to make the
counter-claim, “well so and so misunderstands because
he/she does not have the intuitive capacity and/or back-
g r o u n dk n o w l e d g et og r a s pt h es u b t l en u a n c e so fw h a t
we mean.” Sass repeatedly states that it is very difficult
to describe ipseity which remains a nearly ineluctable
concept [71], and this I find makes the term and its use
problematic.
In this regard, we might ask how does the prefix,
“hyper” clarify the presumed mental processes under
investigation? One meaning of hyper is excess, beyond
t h en o r m a l .O n ec o u l da r g u et h a ts u b j e c t sw h oe n g a g e
in reflective self-focus do so more than healthy indivi-
duals or do so excessively. But this is not what is meant.
Hyper is not simply an incremental “more.” Rather, I
maintain that it means that the process itself is some-
how pathologically increased, not in the sense of fre-
quency or quantitative intensity, but rather
“qualitatively,” i.e., somehow in terms of the internal
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pathology would give rise to this “excess.”
Following my [80] critique of his concept as not tak-
ing into account the more bottom up approach of Bins-
wanger to disrupted self in schizophrenia in terms of
Husserl’s concept of passive synthesis (see Mishara
[19,80,81]; but see also the subsequent discussions
[1,48,82]), Sass reformulated his “hyper-reflexivity” con-
cept to include a more tacit, “operative hyper-reflexiv-
ity.” However, I feel that this adjustment does little to
address the initial problem of being unable to provide
an account for the bottom up disruption of pre-attentive
binding processes of self in schizophrenia (see
[2,3,6,71,80]).
Given this situation, we might ask how might we jus-
tify the same concept, operational-hyper-reflexive-ipse-
ity, to mean both intensified self-consciousness and “a
more operative, automatic, pre-reflective hyper-reflexiv-
ity”? Do not automatic and pre-reflective contradict the
reflectivity of an increased self-consciousness? The “pre-
reflective-operational-hyper-reflexive-ipseity” is the case
of a construct which has been so expanded, in its efforts
to elude criticism, that it refers to opposite and contra-
dictory phenomena.
Contrary to the promissory, neophenomenological
claims that one day we will able to find the neural cor-
relates for ipseity and (operative) hyper-reflexivity, there
is not one foreseeable neuroimaging experiment, at least
to my mind, that could test such hypotheses. (That is,
foreseeable at least to me. I welcome my colleagues to
attempt such an experiment. However, in doing so, they
should be assured that I, and other members of the phi-
losophic and neuroscientific communities, will be very
careful to examine whether they are actually measuring
the construct(s) they claim to be measuring. After all,
that is the minimal criterion for doing science concern-
ing the kind of bold claims they have been making up
to this point). This is because the constructs remain too
vague and expansive to be operationalized in terms of
our current technologies of measuring cognitive and
neural functioning. Ipseity is nearly coextensive with
consciousness itself, and hyper-reflexivity, as we are to
understand from the authors’ own remarks, is nothing
but another form of ipseity and ultimately inseparable
from it.
Neuroimaging experiments require the constructs
under study to be somewhat manageable, i.e., composed
of components which are at least dissociable from one
another or from something as broad and omnipresent
as consciousness itself. They further require the ability
to devise a control task which putatively reproduces the
experimental task in all its details but with the one con-
struct of interest removed. In this way, the control task
may be subtracted from the experimental task to see
what remains above and beyond baseline “default mode”
functioning of the two groups under comparison. For a
discussion of 1) abnormal default mode baseline net-
work activity in schizophrenia, including findings from
our own lab; 2) why mere subtractions of the experi-
mental task from baseline may be misleading in neuroi-
maging experiments with schizophrenia patients, and 3),
the difficulty in making any inferences about self-experi-
ence or other cognitive activity in schizophrenia from
our own finding of abnormal default mode network
functioning, see Mishara [6,71]. As a result of these con-
cerns, it is not at all clear how the two constructs, ipse-
ity and operational hyper-reflexivity, could be
operationalized in a neuroimaging experiment to ascer-
tain, as the neophenomenologists boldly promise, their
“neural correlates.
An additional problem is that the concept hyper-
reflexivity and its variant operative hyper-reflexivity do
not, even remotely, map onto any known cognitive, neu-
ropsychological or neuroscientific concepts. This would
be pardonable if the concepts were sufficiently defined
or precise to be operationalizable in their own right, and
therefore could be tested, for example, in a neuroima-
ging experiment. After all, it is very hard to envision (as
well as test) an automatic, pre-reflective (non-conscious,
and thus not aware) hyper-reflexivity, which is neverthe-
less by its authors’ own definition, an excessive self
awareness or which “takes itself or some aspect of itself
as its own object of awareness.” What would such an
operative or tacitly functioning hyper-reflexivity look
like which would be both excessive awareness and non-
conscious or “automatic"? What would this be if not
pre-attentive bias which is well known to the literature,
but, being nonconscious, automatic, and unmonitored,
would have nothing “hyper” about it? If hyper-reflexivity
precedes or is simultaneous with the pop-out it suppo-
sedly “explains,” how does it know in advance where to
look (i.e., without recruiting the Gestalt-kreis of ongoing
switching between egocentric and allocentric coordi-
nates of motor and perceptual selves, respectively, see
Mishara [3,25,71]).
It is interesting to note that the neural correlates for
attentional networks overlap with those frontal parietal
networks recruited for eye-movement (see [25]). Such
attentional networks are presumably implicated in the
neophenomenologic hypothetical excessive or exagger-
ated self-awareness, that is ,t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e i r
hyper-reflexive-operative-awareness includes attention, a
point in relation to which the neophenomenologists
have up to till now remained silent. That is, attention
itself - just as any bodily self-experience involves the
mediation of what I have been calling a Gestalt-circle
(Gestaltkreis), or a “hidden” and mutually exclusive
unity between perceptual and motor selves. This
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the absolute unity of bodily self as immediately given in
the subjective immanence of self-manifestation, and the
neophenomenological appropriation of the Henryian
exclusively subjective or inner body as the “passive”
autoaffection of ipseity. There is no immediate and pre-
reflective access to self which does not have to traverse
the dilemma of being both an agentic “I” and a bodily
“me” as object, and therefore, the accompanying trans-
form of their respective reference-frames (see
[2,3,9,25,48], and below).
As I introduced earlier in this paper: The experienced
body (and implicated neural pathways) is comprised by
both a motoric-body (proprioceptive-vestibular body-
schema), the “I” (as agent), and perceptual-body
(exteroceptive body-image), the social “me,” united
intermittently, provisionally and fragilely by an intero-
ceptive body (the “mineness” of this relationship) in pre-
attentive “efferent” binding of subcomponents of self
prior to the emergence of self as a “unitary” experience
in awareness [3], p. 609. “Mineness” is disrupted in hyp-
nagogic hallucinations of a double or Doppelgänger
(thus, contra Zahavi, providing one of many possible
dissociations between mineness and consciousness (see
[3,71]), i.e., consciousness, even embodied conscious-
ness, may occur without an accompanying, but also
occasional interoceptive-afferent information about self).
With regard to the body schema/body image concept, I
have written the following summary: “For Paillard [83],
the distinction body-image/body-schema is that between
‘a conscious awareness of one’s own body’ and ‘an o n -
conscious performance of the body’: ‘Proprioceptive
information is obviously necessary for updating the pos-
tural body frame (or schema), whereas exteroceptive
multimodal information, mainly visual, underpins the
central representation and percept of the body image...’
(pp. 197-198). The body-schema provides a ‘path struc-
ture’, superimposed on a collection of separate points, in
a vectorial map which defines in egocentric terms how
awareness is able to shift from a current ‘here’ to an
anticipated but still not consciously known ‘there.’ Pail-
lard [83,84] acknowledges the overlap of his model with
Milner and Goodale’s [85] proposal for a ‘vision-for-per-
ception’ ventral system which is more recently evolved
(mediating awareness) and the more ancient (noncon-
scious) ‘vision-for-action’ dorsal system. For Milner and
Goodale, the dorsal stream projecting from primary
visual cortex to the superior parietal lobes is a key com-
ponent in an action pathway of visual processing which
locates ‘where’ a relevant stimulus might be in the per-
iphery relative to current focal vision... Information may
be relayed to the dorsal or ventral pathways based on its
peripheral or central location in the visual field. Infor-
mation from the peripheral visual field has faster access
to the implicit body-centered computations of dorsal
processing streams than the slower ventral pathways sub-
serving conscious focal awareness. Nowak and Bullier
[86] coined the term ‘fast brain’ for the fronto-parietal
connectivity of the dorsal pathways which, according to
the Goodale Milner model, mediate implicit visuomotor
control (as well as sensori-motor transformations from
other sensory modalities necessary for this control).
That is, information coming from the peripheral visual
field ‘has access to fast, direct pathways that allow for
faster onset times in dorsal stream areas.’ Moreover, we
may conclude that the function of frontodorsal connec-
tivity is the ‘monitoring of peripheral stimuli in general.’
(Stephen et al. [87], p. 3072).” [2], pp. 718-9.
Remarkably, such a system of self as prospective open-
ness, i.e., the ability to be affected by any point in its
experiential field (structured by momentary, possible
movement) prior to focal awareness had been antici-
pated by Husserl (Mishara [ 2 5 ] ) .T h el o c a t i o ni nt h e
field is prospectively structured by the “kinaestheses” of
ocular motor response, i.e., by a potential field that is
structured (nonconsciously) in terms of possible move-
ments (e.g., eye-centered coordinates) required to reori-
ent optimally to the novel target (Claesges, [88]; see also
[2,25]). That is, what Sass [86] describes as the pop out
resulting from operative hyper-reflexivity is generally
described, however, as a top down search in the experi-
mental cognitive literature but there must also be a bot-
tom up emergent affective contrast saliency which
attracts the I-awareness [67,68] in which the “I” (motor
self) already knows how to get there before orienting, e.g.,
the egocentric pathstructure of the eye-movements prior
to awareness. The ipseity/operative hyper-reflexivity
constructs, with their claims of immediate givenness of
(immanent) autoaffection in the subject’s naïve pre-
reflective self-awareness, do not allow for the mediation
of body as both inner and outer in the emergence of
meaningful experience and are unable to address, with
their apparently impoverished and vague concepts, the
complexity of brain function implicated in the phenom-
enology of bodily self. This problem, however, deserves
fuller treatment (see [71]).
Surprisingly, this debate, at least in its rudiments, has
already taken place. The French philosopher, Janicaud
[89] criticizes what he calls the “theological” turn in the
new French phenomenology (including Henry’sc o n c e p t
of pre-reflective self-awareness as ipseity). As the earlier
phenomenologist, Jean Herring expresses it, once you
allow what is considered phenomenologically given to
expand to include metaphysical, biblical, theological, and
mystical terms, the rigorous methodology of phenomen-
ology declines into a “pseudophenomenology.”“ It is not
difficult to foresee that the hour when [phenomenology]
will become àl am o d e...[and we] will see the springing
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(cited by Prussak, [89], p. 4, insert is mine). It appears
to me that this time has come.
Janicaud and then later, Derrida critique the tendency
of the new French phenomenologists to expand the
phenomenological concept of givenness (e.g., Henry’s
absolute knowledge of self as prereflective passive self-
affection) beyond what is accessible according to
phenomenology’s own method. Prusak writes: “such
givenness is finally a mere concept without intuitions, a
concept that it might be possible to think, but that is
impossible to experience and to know” [89], p. 4.
As I deal with these themes in more detail in other
contributions (Mishara [6,71]), I limit the current dis-
cussion to aspects relevant to our main question: to
what extent does the operative hyper-reflexivity con-
struct help us understand hypnagogic hallucinations as
documented in Kafka’s writings, or related phenomena
in schizophrenia (see [48,49])? In this regard, Sass [90]
appropriates Bleuler’sc o n c e p t“doublebookkeeping” as
the schizophrenia patient’s ability to function in both
the everyday world shared with others, and the world of
the delusions and hallucinations. For example, a delu-
sional patient claims that she is being poisoned and yet,
continues to eat the hospital food. Sass explains that the
patient does not act on the delusions and hallucinations
because they are “felt by the patient to exist only ‘in the
mind’se y e , ” that is, what Sass calls the hyper-reflexivity
of “an Apollonian illness.” Citing Sechehaye’s Autobio-
graphy of a Schizophrenic Girl [91]), Sass [90] defines
this Apollonian illness: “... many schizophrenic patients
describe the world of psychosis as a place not of dark-
ness but of relentless light - light being the natural
metaphor for conscious awareness... [and then citing
Sechehaye] ‘where reign(s) an implacable light, blinding,
leaving no place for shadow,’” p. 117 (my insertion).
Sass writes: “In my view, the experience of many schizo-
phrenic patients involves not an overwhelming by but a
detachment from normal forms emotion and desire, not
a loss but an exacerbation of various forms of self-con-
scious awareness” [90], p. 12. It is hard to imagine how
such Apollonian “relentless light” could become auto-
matic or unconscious in so-called operative hyper-
reflexivity when it is a metaphor for conscious aware-
ness itself.
Sass [90] continues that in such an illness, there is
“not an overwhelming by but detachment from the
instinctual sources of vitality, not immersion in the sen-
sory surround but disengagement from a derealized
external world, not stuporous waning from awareness”
(p. 117). In contrast, I have proposed that Berze, Con-
rad, Binswanger, Blankenburg, Ey, Straus and numerous
other psychiatrists in the phenomenological tradition
(with regard to whom Louis Sass claims, incorrectly I
believe, direct lineal descent) describe schizophrenia
completely differently as a Dionysian illness [1,80,82,92].
For example, the phenomenological psychiatrist, Conrad
[93] characterizes the paranoid delusional patient in a
world between waking and sleeping, “a world of fluctuat-
ing Gestalten, concerning which up to this point, the
poet has much more knowledgeable things to say than
the psychologist” p. 378, my translation. As schizophre-
nia for Conrad is a being “caught between sleep and
wakefulness,” double bookkeeping is not some intellec-
tual indulgence, an intensifying of intact rational or
attentional processes, an ability to detach and partici-
pate willy-nilly in two worlds by straddling them.
Rather, as in the disorder sleep paralysis,
xlii the patient
is simultaneously aware of two “realities,” the compelling
reality of her hypnagogic hallucinations or felt presences
(from which the patient is unable to critically detach),
on the one hand, and the world of her awake life on the
other [3,48]. Caught somewhere in between, it is not that
she belongs to both worlds but to none, and tries unsuc-
cessfully to find her way back.
By comparing the experiences of schizophrenia with
sleep paralysis, I am not endorsing the so-called “rapid
eye-movement (REM) hypothesis” of schizophrenia, but
rather that schizophrenia, like dreaming, hypnagogic or
autoscopic hallucinations involves a disengagement or
reduction of what cognitive neuroscience calls conscious
controlled processing, not its exacerbation (whether
reflective or pre-reflective, controlled or automatic, top
down or bottom up, or whatever other variant of his
hyper-reflexivity concept Sass wishes to claim). Experi-
mental and neuroimaging results with schizophrenia
patients decidedly do not support the “Apollonian”
interpretation (see [3,6]). Note that the sleep paralysis
patient, as the psychotic, may feel in her state infinite
distance from the world shared with others (what we
have previously described as social deafferentation, Hoff-
man [34]). Moreover, the feeling of a presence,
xlii or the
intensity of hypnagogic hallucinations, as we have seen
above, may be a response to this feeling of distance or
deprivation (and the underlying neural processes). This
is not the detachment from too much intellect or lack
of emotion. It is rather precisely the inability to dis-
tance, or separate from (i.e., transcend) what Conrad
[93,6] calls the physiognomic expressiveness of the hal-
lucinatory “pre-Gestalt” (Vorgestalt) during paranoid
psychosis and hypnagogic experiences. Moreover, it is
not the detachment resulting from too much intellect or
lack of emotion, a hyper-reflexive “solipsism“ [90], see
[71] for review. It is rather precisely the inability to criti-
cally distance, separate from (i.e., transcend) the physiog-
nomically expressive Vorgestalt, in an oneric “world”
populated by hallucinated doubles (i.e., precisely not a
solipsism but a modified intersubjectivity [71]). That is,
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experience of objects in a dream or in early stages of
perceptual meaning in tatiscopic experimental studies of
microgenesis. These incomplete “objects” (taken as if
they were objects complete with perceptual meaning)
are very much like the hypnagogic doubles described in
Kafka’s writings and those hallucinations experienced in
autoscopy [3].
Conrad describes the patient’s subjective experience of
delusions (e.g., “delusional perceptions, “ideas” of refer-
ence) as a “protopathic functional change of the pre-
Gestalt (Vorgestalt),” (employing Sir Henry Head’sa n d
von Weizsäcker’s [53] concepts respectively; for reviews
of Conrad’su s eo fH e a d ’s and von Weizsäcker’st e r m i -
nology, see [48,49]). In contrast to the neophenomeno-
logic imprecise analogies between their concepts and
contemporary neuroscience (see [71], and above), Mis-
hara and Corlett [97] provide a neurobiological account
of Conrad’s phenomenologic approach to aberrant sal-
iency in beginning psychosis in terms of the disrupted
prediction error of a perception action cycle.
Sass (e.g., [90,98,99]) emphasizes that his own analysis
based on Sechayes’ [91] Autobiography of a Schizophre-
nic Girl is consistent with Conrad’s [95] phenomenolo-
gical approach. We have already noted that Sechehaye’s
book is central to Sass’ own Apollonian hyper-reflexive
account of schizophrenia. However, Conrad [95] is very
clear in his classic monograph in devoting over five
pages (!) to refuting any effort to examine schizophrenia,
which bases itself on Sechehaye’s book, denouncing the
very same passages which Sass [90,99] cites as evidence
for the harmony between Conrad and his use of Seche-
haye’s work (for complete discussion, see [71]). In short,
I maintain that Conrad’s concepts do not support the
Apollonian or “operative” versions of the hyper-reflexiv-
ity concept (as further documented in other publica-
tions, e.g., [71]). The inability of the schizophrenia
patient to shift perspectives or frames of reference in
terms of a Gestaltkreis is central to the works of Bins-
wanger, Blankenburg, Conrad, Kraus, Wyss and numer-
ous other phenomenologic psychiatrists [48,49].
It is striking that those proponents of what I have
labeled the neo-phenomenological position completely
omit Viktor von Weizsäcker’s work or his concept of
Gestaltkreis from their discussions. This is remarkable
because von Weizsäcker’s work has been acknowledged
by many of those phenomenological thinkers and clini-
cians - cited by the neophenomenologists as the very
phenomenologists supporting their position - to play an
important, if not major role in the development of their
thinking, e.g., Binswanger, Blankenburg, Bujtendijk,
Conrad, Ey, Merleau-Ponty, Plessner, Plügge, Straus, and
countless others. In fact, I have had numerous conversa-
tions concerning von Weizsäcker’si n f l u e n c eo n
phenomenology (including their own work) with Blan-
kenburg, Bräutigam, Christian, Claesges, Gadamer,
Graumann, Hahn, Janzarick, Jantz, Kraus, Kuhn (Bins-
wanger’s close friend and discoverer of Imipramine, the
first tricyclic antidepressant), Landgrebe, Lang, Mundt,
T e l l e n b a c h ,v o nB a y e r ,v o nU s l a r ,T .v o nU x k ü h l ,C . F .
von Weizsäcker, R. Wiehl and Wyss and others. The
neophenomenological neglect of von Weizsäcker’sw o r ki s
egregious but understandable, given the extent it under-
mines their own position.
In keeping with the current effort to examine the lit-
erary “data” concerning paranoid hypnagogic experience,
Conrad characterizes the paranoid delusional world
between waking and sleeping as “a world of fluctuating
Gestalten, concerning which up to this point, the poet
has much more knowledgeable things to say than the
psychologist” [93], p. 378, my trans). Conrad observes
the similarly between earlier stages of unformed percep-
tions in microgenetic experiments, or impoverished per-
ceptual conditions, and the dreamer’s or hallucinating
patient’s acceptance of the incomplete Gestalt (Vorges-
talt) as given. In describing the application of microge-
netic procedure to schizophrenia, Flavell and Draguns
[100] describe “schizophrenia as a condition in which
early cognitive formations intrude into consciousness
and get expressed as though they were completed
thoughts.” Once we are able to detach from the incom-
plete perceptions and our productive responses, e.g., hal-
lucinations, dreams or even literary creations, they
release us and suffer a kind of death (Conrad [96], p.
41) as when the child ghost releases the narrator in Kaf-
ka’s Unhappiness.
Broad and sweeping general statements have been
made about Kafka and “modernism.” For example,
Kafka, has been called “t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ew r i t e ro fo u r
century” (Karl [101], xvii), but, given Kafka’sd o c u m e n -
ted proclivities for social isolation, we ask representative
for whom? Similarly, Sass [98] calls Kafka “af i g u r e
representative of the age,” and “one of the most repre-
sentative of twentieth century writers.” Nevertheless,
Sass [98] also makes the highly controversial remark
(which I examine elsewhere [71]) that Kafka presents
“the most vivid evocation of schizophrenic experience in
all of Western literature.” That is, according to Sass,
Kafka is both modern (representative of the age) and
depicts the schizophrenic condition. He is characterized
by Apollonian “detachment” and “indifference,” which,
for Sass, is shared by both modernism and schizophre-
nia. Unlike Sass, I make no effort, apart from Kafka’s
possible cluster headaches [15], to diagnose Kafka on
the basis of his literary work. However, to the extent
that we consider the problem according to Nietzsche’s
[102] Apollonian vs. Dionysian opposition, there is no
doubt on which side of this dilemma Kafka himself
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dig a subterranean passage. Some progress must be
made. My station up there is much too high. We are
digging the pit of Babel” (Kafka [10], p. 464). That is,
building = writing (as in The Burrow) cannot be
achieved from the lofty heights of reflective awareness
(as we have seen from Kafka’s The Bridge). There is no
reflective distance here. Kafka’s preoccupation with the
self’s depths (as already suggested by the symbolism of
the mirror in his story, Unhappiness) was not born from
Apollonian, detached reflection of hyper-concentration,
what Merleau-Ponty [78] describes as an “aerial perspec-
tive.” It was also not born from a putatively buried,
tacitly functioning, but also neurobiologically implausi-
ble “operative” hyper-reflexivity. Rather, Kafka describes
his own writing as aD i o n y s i a nd e s c e n ti nw h i c ht h es e l f
becomes dissolved in its own origins (i.e according to the
symbolism of rebirth which the “twice born” Dionysus
himself experienced).
For Kafka, writing is a trancelike Dionysian activity at
night opening the endless inner darkness of self as an
abyss without bottom. Recall Kafka’s own descriptions
of the writing process, e.g., “From the depths I would
drag it up! Without effort!,” or, “All I possess are certain
powers which, at a depth inaccessible under normal
conditions, shape themselves into literature...” or that it
is “not alertness but self-oblivion [that] is the precondi-
tion of writing” [41,46], and cited above. Here, self-
depiction in art hardly takes an Apollonian turn (in the
sense of Sass’ concept of hyper-reflexivity) [1]. In Kafka’s
stories, “AD r e a m ,”“ A Hunger Artist,” and “The Bur-
row,” digging into, or merging back into the earth exert
an insuppressible attraction on the protagonist. The bur-
rowing into earth, the (endless) inner journey of the self
as underworld in the short stories, Hunter Gracchus, A
Visit to a Mine,o rI was a visitor among the dead is a
Dionysian attempt to access the self from inside in
terms of its inner depths (Kurz [14]; Mishara [68]), not
the Apollonian perspective of the detached aerial view
of hyper-reflection. For reviews of the Dionysian cri-
tique, see [1,80,92].
The Hypnagogic Symbolism of Rebirth: How the
Self reflects its Own Structure as a Process
In his novel, Amerika, Kafka depicts his protagonist,
Karl Rossmann as scribbling in his notebook with a
fountain pen the manageress had just given him. In
itself, this event is not particularly remarkable. However,
as Malcolm Pasley [103] notes, “Shortly before writing
this passage, as one can see from the manuscript, the
novelist clearly had to struggle with, and replace, a mal-
functioning fountain pen. Here we see how closely the
written text - the work - relates to the physical act of
writing and even to the small calamities that can occur
during the writing process” (p. 203). Now, this is rather
an odd breaking of the narrative frame to include an
event, which occurs during the physical writing itself,
but which seems trivial in its own right. However, we
see numerous instances in Kafka’sn a r r a t i v et e x t sw h i c h
include references to Kafka’s own writing or artistic
activity during the very composition of the text (e.g., the
writing desk in “I was a visitor among the dead,” the
artist’s pencil which produces in gold lettering the letter
Ko nt h ep r o t a g o n i s t ’s own tombstone while the prota-
gonist watches in AD r e a m ,
xliv the punitive writing
machine in AP e n a lC o l o n y ). Here, the act of writing
seems to be reflected in the symbolic imagery of the
narrative itself.
We know such “breaking frame” from Baroque rococo
paintings (e.g., [104]). In figure 4, the artist, Phillip Frie-
derich von Hetsch, deliberately portrays his figures as
actually descending towards the viewer from the frame
of the architecturally spatial area meant to contain
them. However, this deliberate device only remotely
r e s e m b l e sw h a ti sg o i n go ni nK a f k a ’sw o r k .W h e n
Kafka includes the reference to Karl Rossmann making
use of a lent fountain pen in Amerika, it is clear that he
is not expecting his audience to know that he himself as
writer had to just replace his own malfunctioning pen.
That is, it is likely that the initial occurrence of the sym-
bolically reflexive meaning (Silberer’s auto-symbolism) in
the flow of hypnagogic images that putatively informed
Kafka’sw r i t i n gw a si n i t i ally unconscious.A sa l r e a d y
noted, Kafka himself reports that he experienced writing
(at least in its initial phases) as automatic, effortless and
informed by hypnagogic imagery. That is, Kafka both
records and shapes his hypnagogic imagery and it’s
meaning while writing in what I have described as a
trance-state during sleep-, but also sensory- and social-
deprivation. Kafka’s spontaneous self-reference to his
own writing activity in the symbolic imagery of the hyp-
nagogic imagery he records while writing initially func-
tions precisely to the degree that it remains
nonconscious, i.e., not directly formulated in awareness,
without so-called Apollonian hyper-reflexivity playing a
role.
As noted with Silberer’s introspective experiments
regarding his own hypnagogic experiences while falling
asleep, a requirement for the autosymbolic hallucination
to occur, the subject is unaware at the time that his own
mind is producing its symbolic meaning. The phenomen-
ological psychiatrist, Conrad also reports similar intro-
spective results with regard to his own hypnagogic
imagery. He states, “precisely in the relaxing of effortful
attention, indeed in passive dreaming sunkenness, the
s o l u t i o na p p e a r si na ni m a g e .It is important to note
however that in the dream it does not appear as a solu-
tion to a long sought after problem but rather as an
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ing indicidentally.I ti so n l yi nw a k i n gt h a ti ti sr e a l i z e d
that the image brings a solution to the puzzle” (Conrad
[96], p. 39, my translation and emphases). That is, as we
have already seen in the dilemma of the narcoleptic
sleep paralysis patient, who, like the country doctor, is
caught between worlds, the two worlds, conscious wak-
ing experience and the formation of autosymbolic hallu-
cinations are mutually exclusive and yet, one “world” is
unable to exist without the other. The phenomenologi-
cal psychologist, von Uslar [105] writes of two mutually
“excluding realities of the waking and dream worlds”
(p. 19). These two worlds mutually presuppose but
exclude one another in the dialectical relationship of a
Gestalt-circle.
xlv
Nevertheless, as we have already noted, there is some-
thing about the process of the self-reference of the wri-
ter in Kafka’s hypnagogic protagonist doubles that
Figure 4 Example of Rococo Art Breaking Frame, Phillip Friederich von Hetsch's Allegory of Merit Accompanied by Nobility and Virtue
(1758).
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ney” of symbolic transformation of self as a process of
rebirth through narrative imagery remains unfinished.
We find a hint in Kafka’s remarkable story, “The Hunter
Graccus” (1916/1917). Here, the protagonist Graccus
(whose name we have already noted suggests Kafka’s
own name) is unable to die. Generations and genera-
tions of bureaucrats are unable to arrive at a decision
before being interrupted by their own deaths. As a
result, Graccus’ leaving this world has indefinitely put
on hold . Due to fact that the character of Hunter Grac-
cus is already fictional, one might argue, taking a rather
literal standpoint, that he is unable to die because he
has never lived. He actually recounts his life as fictive in
the following (deliberate) “slip” that Kafka inserted into
the text: “Nobody will read what I write here.”
xlvi
That is, it is no longer the fictive Graccus speaking
but Kafka as narrating author, who once again bemoans
the incompleteness of his narratives now depicted in
Graccus’ infinite journey (caught between worlds), with-
out foreseeable end. Similarly, the protagonist at the end
of A Country Doctor complains of a journey without
end: “Never shall I reach my home at this rate. ...Naked,
exposed to the frost of this most unhappy of ages, with
an earthly vehicle and unearthly horses ...My fur coat is
hanging from the back of the gig, but I cannot reach it”
[10], p. 225. In still another story with a similar ending
(i.e., without end), the protagonist in The Bucket Rider
finds himself exposed to the cold without any promise
of ever finding an end to his journey. Here, the protago-
nist has the unique ability to ride his bucket through
the village precisely because he has run out of coal and
the bucket is empty: “I must have coal; I cannot freeze
to death; ...Seated on my bucket, my hands on the han-
dle, the simplest kind of bridle, I propel myself with dif-
ficulty down the stairs, but once downstairs my bucket
ascends superbly, superbly” (pp. 412-3). While hovering
outside the coal-dealer’s window and appealing to the
latter’s wife for some coal, he describes his experience:
“She sees and hears nothing; but all the same she loos-
ens her apron strings and waves her apron to waft me
away... My bucket has all the virtues of a good steed
except powers of resistance, which it has not; it is too
light; a woman’s apron can make it fly through the air...
And with that I ascend into the regions of the ice
mountains and am lost forever.” In the bucket rider,
Kafka [10] depicts the feeling of a passively floating out
of body-like experience which occurs as hypnagogic hal-
lucination during sleep paralysis and/or dreaming [3],
but still, unlike dreaming, from which we can wake,
these stories refer to their own incompleteness or
absence of any resolvable ending.
The journey to the interior of the self as endless des-
cent to an underworld is suggested by Kafka’ss t o r i e s ,
“A Visit to the Mines,” and “Hunter Graccus.” It is also
reflected in contemporary existential thought. Jaspers
had compared inner reflection to a conversation or a
journey in which one cannot predict one’sd e s t i n a t i o n
from one’s starting point. The discovery of the inner as
boundless and dangerous is also reflected in Jung’s
work. In the 1960’s, the metaphor of inner journey as a
process of rebirth of the self was sometimes used in the
experimentation with psychedelic drugs. The phenom-
enological psychiatrist Wyss [106], who had trained with
both Jaspers and von Weizsäcker, writes: “Self-percep-
tion, the inner world appears primarily dark... In self-
perception, there emerges from the darkness, ‘from out
of the depths’, phenomena such as memories, images,
thoughts, moods, which enter and disappear from the
horizon of waking consciousness as a ‘stream of con-
sciousness’” (pp. 166-7, my translation).
A sIh a v ep r e v i o u s l yw r i t t e n ,“During the narrative
effort, the self simultaneously takes on the roles of the
narrator and the narrated self of the traumatic event.
The process of separating these selves, letting go, and
sense of completion is still under way.... Straus wrote
that we experience distance not in terms of objective
space but in terms of our own momentary ability for
movement. It is for this reason that we have no distance
in the dream because the dream landscape moves with
us and encloses us within its horizon. We are always in
the present in the dream, enveloped within the imma-
nence of our own bodies, in a private universe” (Mishara
[18]). Thus the ability to seamlessly shift frames between
a narrating subject and one which is embedded within
the development of the narrative may have its (neural)
basis in the opposition body image/body schema. To
narrate about oneself is an act of self-transcendence
because one experiences oneself as both active narrating
subject and narrated object (as if seen from others’
point of view). This reflects a fundamental paradox of
human existence, I can only become myself by letting
myself go, by transcending what I just was (von Weiz-
säcker [53]). For Sartre [39], I am divested from my
body as object the moment that I assume it. That is, I
can only have a body in retrospect, but am condemned
to being a body self prospectively open or vulnerable to
its own future who, at each moment, must sever itself
from (i.e., transcend) each of its ongoing achievements/
experiences as already past [25].
I propose that the symbolic doubling process recorded
in Kafka’s narrative imagery reflects something deeply
embedded in how the human capacity for narrative
evolved, in the relationship between the author’s, or nar-
rator’s self and that which he/she narrates. That is, the
act of narrating requires an ongoing shifting between
internal and external perspectives or reference frames
with regard to one’s own body. The narrating I is
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narrative is computed in egocentric coordinates. How-
ever the narrator narrates a self already embedded in
scene based allocentric coordinates and becomes
entranced like his audience in the unfolding of these
scenes from the standpoint of the protagonist. The narra-
tor must shift back and forth from being absorbed in
the narrative unfolding of his/her own story to quick
decision processes of “where” to go next, which narra-
tive path to take, not unlike envisioning chess moves, or
taking a new route, several steps in advance. The latter
process occurs in terms of what I have been referring to
as the egocentric reference frame of an on line body
schema. The double (as in Kafka’s initially hypnagogic
narratives) symbolizes the embodied self precisely as a
process which in its very nature is a self-transcending
[2,3,18,39,53,62,67,68,78,95].
Conclusions
In summary, the structure of the self is vulnerable to
doubling. This doubling occurs during anomalous states
of consciousness (where reflection is minimal and trance-
like, dream-like single-mindedness prevails). It involves
the structure of self as both self-transcendent and inter-
subjective (in terms of the symbolic imagery of “rebirth”).
The literary data considered in this paper reflect a change
of consciousness which has its neurobiological basis in
increased cortical excitability of a social network (acti-
vated during states of deprivation, sensory, social and
sleep). The paranoid delusions of schizophrenia resemble
hypnagogic hallucinations in the patient’s inability to
detach from incomplete information, what the phenom-
enological psychiatrist, Klaus Conrad describes as a pre-
gestalt (Vorgestalt), and what has more recently been
called, “aberrant salience.” Current neuroscience studies
the self as object or representation. Literature informs
the clinical neuroscientific study of self because the struc-
ture of self (as self-transcending process, i.e., as both sub-
ject and object) is captured in a literature which reflects
its own creative process in hypnagogic symbols. Contrary
to the apparently popularizing, but unverifiable views
which interpret the self as “distorted” pre-reflective,
hyper-reflexive self awareness in neuropscyhiatric disor-
ders and anomalous conscious states, the “self” informs
our hypnagogic imagery precisely to the extent that we are
not self-aware.
Notes
i. This paper is much modified and expanded version of
a paper, “The Literary Neuroscience of Kafka’sH y p n a -
gogic Hallucinations: How Literature Informs the Neu-
roscientific Study of Self and its Disorders,” to appear in
Jaen-Portillo, I., Simon, J. (eds). The Cognition of
Literature.
ii. Phenomenological-psychiatrists and researchers
(e.g., Binswanger, Buytendijk, Tellenbach) justify their
use of literature as a source for phenomenological “data”
for providing the structures of healthy (and abnormal)
consciousness by referring to Husserl’s method of imagi-
native variation (described below).
iii. In Kafka’s work, the writer’ss e l fi sd o u b l e di nt h e
protagonist in different ways: 1) The narrator’s and pro-
tagonist’s perspectives collapse into one another. That
is, the narrator’s purview is limited to that of the prota-
gonist so that we experience everything from the prota-
gonist’s claustrophobic view-point (as in Kafka’sn o v e l s ,
The Trial, The Castle). 2) The protagonist is named
some variant of Kafka’s own name such as “K” or “Josef
K.” In Kafka’s The Metamorphosis,t h ep r o t a g o n i s t ’s
name, Gregor Samsa resembles Kafka’so w nn a m e
(Samsa =K afka). The Hunter Gracchus in Kafka’s story
w i t ht h es a m en a m ea l s os u g g e s t st h en a m eK a f k a
(Kavka in Czech means Jackdaw, and graccio in Italian
means Crow’s caw or call). That is, the protagonist
stands in for the author as a double, but takes on a life
of his own.
iv. Previous commentaries on the “doubles” in Kafka’s
literary work cite as instances of such doubling either
the twin helpers, Artur and Jeremias, in Kafka’s The
Castle,o rt h et w o“small white celluloid balls” which
seem to pursue Bloomfield, the Elderly Bachelor.T h e
latter are later replaced by two assistants who resemble
the twin helpers in The Castle. Collins [11] interprets
these instances of doubles as serving the function of a
“chorus, personifying the society that accuses him inex-
plicably” (p. 7). He suggests that one source of Kafka’s
use of twin-doubles (in The Castle and Bloomfield)w a s
a Yiddish theater performance Kafka witnessed in 1911.
As indicated by his diary entry at the time, Kafka was
impressed by the two twin clown-like figures played
husband and his wife ("Mrs. K., a ‘male impersonator’”).
“Light as a feather, [they] sink to the ground under the
slightest pressure...sensitive, [they] cry easily with dry
f a c e s. . . b u ta ss o o na st h ep r e s s u r ei sr e m o v e d[ t h e y ]
haven’t the slightest specific gravity but must bounce
right back up the air” (Kafka [12], p. 65). Flickert [13]
interprets the two dancing, bouncing twin celluloid balls
in Bloomfield in terms of the Doppelgänger motif which
has been prevalent in German literature since the
Romantics. However, these commentators do not take
make the additional claim, as I do here, that Kafka’s
doubling pervades his entire corpus, i.e., that his rela-
tionship as author to his own protagonists is itself a
doubling process, which is further reflected in the
encounters between the protagonists and the figures
they encounter. Moreover, the symbolic doubling reflects
something deeply embedded in how the capacity for
narrative evolved in the human brain, i.e., in the
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and that which he/she narrates, as both narrator and
witness to one’s own narration (see final section of this
paper). In this regard, Kurz’s [14] observation is more
relevant than Collins’ and Flickert’s prior commentaries:
“Kafka’s heroes are split-figures, split into themselves
and others, their others. Kafka himself was a split-per-
son, on the outside, a thoroughly correct office worker,
who took his obligations seriously, and yet also, some-
one who is ‘nothing else than literature’ (from Kafka’s
Diaries)” (p. 31, my translation). Kafka’sf r e q u e n tm e n -
tion of a “writing desk” in his fictional writings (see
below) suggests both his day job in the insurance office
but also his stealthy literary activity at night. Kurz writes
that “the protagonist... is the measure of time and space
for the other figures. These only exist through his view
or in his thoughts.” ([14], p. 187). The other figures
then seem to have a dependence, not unlike a dream,
on the protagonist’s perspective. Not unlike a dream,
they appear as dependent on the protagonist’s perspec-
tive “as variants of one another... doubling or tripling
oneselves” ([14], p. 188, my translations).
v. The mirror is locus of both self and double.
vi. Clearly, readers not acquainted with Kafka’s living
circumstances at the time of writing this story could
hardly be expected to appreciate this parallel between
the narrator and Kafka. We might ask then, why is it in
the story? Is it a mere association that Kafka himself
had while writing (possibly inadvertent) which he did
not subsequently bother to remove despite the fact that
most audiences would be unable to appreciate it? Or, is
it reminiscent of those architects who built ornate sta-
tues hidden high in the corners of Gothic cathedrals for
God’s appreciation alone as no human eye could see
them? In the final section of the paper, I return to this
problem.
vii. Doppelgänger (autoscopic) hallucinations may
occur in neurologic disorders and anomalous conscious-
states (e.g., dream-states). The hallucinated double is
experienced (precisely as double) as both stranger and
intimate. As a result, there is often a resulting struggle
of who “mirrors” whom [3], also present in Kafka’s
story. The “double” need not physically resemble the
self and may even differ in gender. Here, there is the
suggestion that a literary or fictional character, who
serves as a double for the writer himself, may herself
entertain questions about her own existence (see the
discussion of The Hunter Gracchus below). As we will
further examine, “fattening up” the existence of the fic-
tional character may be contrasted with its complete
dissolution as in The Hunger Artist, who, as artist, refers
to his own status as (symbolic) double of the author.
“Fattening up” such an existence is contrasted with its
complete dissolution as in “The Hunger Artist,” who, as
artist, refers to his own status as (symbolic) double of
the author.
viii. Autoscopy (from the ancient Greek, ‘seeing one-
self’) is a loosely related complex of experiences in
which one sees or experiences a “double” as external to
one’s current vantage point. These hallucinations may
occur in epilepsy, brain-tumor s ,s c h i z o p h r e n i a ,d e p r e s -
sion, intoxication, dissociative experiences, hypnagogic/
hypnopompic hallucinations and in individuals with
high fantasy-proneness. Literary authors often describe
autoscopy (e.g., G. D’Annunzio, F. Dostoevsky, J.W. v.
Goethe, E.T.A. Hoffmann, G. de Maupassant, A. de
Musset, E. A. Poe, J.P. Richter, P. B. Shelley, R.L.
Stevenson), many of whom experienced autoscopy
themselves [3].
ix. In what is termed echopraxia (imitation of the sub-
ject’s movements), the double reaches up to turn on the
light, which the patient also attempts. However, the
double moves her left-arm symmetrically to the patient’s
as in a mirror. This suggests that the perceptual “body
image” is involved. When we look at a mirror we see
only the perceptual body (the body as we see it, or ima-
gine it, from outside) reflected in a left-right reversal:
when the patient moves her right arm, the mirror-dou-
ble moves her left. Precisely as perceptual body image,
the mirror image is computed in the coordinates of an
allocentric, object-centered reference frame. If the dou-
ble, as it sometimes happens in autoscopic hallucina-
tions, imitates my movements, but moves the
contralateral arm to me (e.g., his right arm, when I
move my right arm), then the double is engaging, or
‘making use of’ my motoric-body (moving in the same
egocentric, body-centered coordinate reference frame in
which I move my own body, i.e., the “body schema” as
agentic “I”). This appearance of the double, I argue [3],
indicates a “deeper,” more engaged hallucinatory invol-
vement with the self and therefore, different neural
pathways are implicated. The two experiences (and
underlying neural systems) of body, one motoric (pro-
prioceptive), the other perceptual (exteroceptive), have
been called in the neurologic literature, body schema
(the agentic “I”)a n db o d yi m a g e( t h es o c i a l“me”)
[2,3,22-25]. Interestingly, although more convincing, the
motor doubles are much less life-like than the percep-
tual-mirror doubles and tend to be colorless, pale, trans-
parent, cloudy, misty, or ghost-like. In contrast, the
perceptual-body-image autoscopy, predominantly invol-
ving lesions to visual-occipital areas of the brain, is gen-
erally more vivid and brightly colored. However, the
motoric double (often involving parietal and tempopar-
ietal junction areas) is experienced as more convincing
than its perceptual counterpart. The view that the more
motoric, body schema autoscopy may be delusional (or
dreamlike) is supported by the fact that this form of
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with or trying to free oneself from one’s double (an I/I
rather then the mirror-like I-me relationship of body-
image autoscopy). In a previous publication, I have
labeled the more superficial perceptual autoscopy, Type
I (predominantly visual autoscospy), and the deeper var-
iant involving the motoric body schema, Type II (delu-
sional-dreamlike autoscopy) [3]. It is only in response to
Type II autoscopy that the patient in a confused state
may attempt suicide through fighting with or trying to
free oneself from one’s double. . The case of the mourn-
ing schoolteacher [21] described here, however, does not
fit neatly into this clear-cut taxonomy of autoscopy. The
patient exhibits a disruption of body image in that the
double’s imitative movements are symmetrical to the
subject’s with the same left-right reversal that one
experiences in a mirror. However, the double also
touches her in a way that leads to a depersonalizing rela-
tionship to the patient’s own body (the patient felt “cold
and bloodless from the contact”). This suggests involve-
ment of the “deeper,” multi-modal engagement of self in
the Type II, delusional-dreamlike autoscopy [3].
x. “... war er nur beobachtend, da ich mich eben beo-
bachtete...” Kafka [26], p. 342.
xi. This recalls the above discussion of the two types of
autoscopy. If the motoric-body is implicated (in “Type II
delusional-dreamlike autoscopy” [3]), the hallucinatory-
double takes independence from the self (in an “I/I” rela-
tionship) and anticipates the subject’s actions. One’so w n
self is experienced as correspondingly passive as if the
double were usurping or preempting the sense of self as
the empowered agent. Unlike the mirroring in Type I
(predominantly visual) autoscopy which involves body
image, the motoric body schema autoscopy is character-
ized by the feeling that one (ironically) becomes the mir-
ror image of the double, who usurps the feeling of being
the “real self.” T h e r em a yb eaf e e l i n go fo n e n e s sw i t h
the hallucination as if the two terms (self and double) are
“emotionally linked,” share a “feeling of belonging,” or
complete one another [3]. Brugger et al. [27] depict the
experience of an autoscopic patient, PH, who has an
invasive tumor originating in the left posterior insula,
destructive of his left-temporal lobe, and extending into
left frontal and parietal areas. Just as Kafka reports a split
relationship with himself vis-à-vis the observing double
in the mirror, PH reports awakening one night to find
that his bodily self has split in half. Concurrently, five
“doubles” either mimic or act independently from him
on his right side, contralaterally to the tumor. The pre-
s e n c eo fm o r et h a no n ed o u b l ei sc a l l e d“polyopic heau-
toscopy” [27], and is a variant of what I have classified as
t h em o r ee n g a g i n gT y p eI Id e l u s i o n a l - d r e a m l i k ea u t o -
scopy [3]. Here the doubles both anticipate the patient’s
own movements in echopraxia, but also act
independently from him. In E.T.A. Hoffmann’sr e m a r k -
able short story, N e wY e a rE v e ’sA d v e n t u r e[28], one of
the characters, Erasmus describes how he came to loose
his mirror image which he experiences most painfully as
a split with himself. Somehow forced to narrate the story
in third person, i.e., as now an I/I rather than I/me rela-
tionship [3], he recounts how he first lost the image:
“Erasmus saw his image step forward independent of his
movements, glide into Giuletta’s arms and disappear in a
vapor” [28], p. 122. As in Kafka’s description of the mir-
ror, or PH’s multiple doubles, the image acts indepen-
dently from the self. Once the double acts independently,
or anticipates the subject’s own movements and thoughts
in Type II motoric-dreamlike autoscopy, it is as if it steps
outside the mirror and begins to act in the (normally
unconscious) egocentric, body-centered coordinates of
body schema [3]. Moreover, the double has access to the
subject’s own intentions before or during their execution.
Although Kafka and Hoffmann both describe experiences
that initially involve mirror reflection, the fact that the
mirror image starts to act independently from the self
suggests that the body schema and not merely the more
superficial, mirror-based perceptual body image is
involved.
xii. The fact that the protagonist “awakens” to find
himself in entirely changed circumstances, as in Kafka’s
A Country Doctor (see below) and The Trial,s u g g e s t s
that the transformation has somehow occurred or
started to occur during the night, while the fictive char-
acter dreams, but his author remains awake, sleep
deprived, through the night (as was often Kafka’sp r a c -
tice during writing). We will further explore below the
protagonist’sn o c t u r n a l“transformation,” a “journey”
between worlds, as referring, in part, to Kafka’so w n
transformed state of mind while writing.
xiii. “The decision he must disappear was one that he
held to even more strongly than his sister, if that were
possible” [10], p. 135. Cf. Kafka’s A Hunger Artist.
xiv. The charwoman is “not allowed to tell her story.”
[10], p. 138-9. This and other allusions to incomplete or
interrupted narratives may reflect Kafka’so w ne x p e r i -
ence of the failure of his narratives to connect the sub-
jective-inner experience of self with the outer social self
as it is experienced by others (in this case, the “thing”
which the Charwoman disposes of). Kafka sometimes
narrates his protagonists as caught between worlds, and
between mental states, never properly received by an
audience (as A Hunger Artist (1922) (and Kafka himself)
because of the thingness of the body, or the corpus of
the text which, rather than conveying expressions of
one’s subjectivity to others, only gets in the way. See the
discussion of An Imperial Message, below (See also A
Little Woman (1923) and First Sorrow (1922), written
around the same time as A Hunger Artist).
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of autoscopic doubling in which the very mirroring
becomes obstructive to the protagonist’s own objectives.
In Kafka’s earliest published story, Descriptions of a
Struggle (version A written 1903-4; version B, 1909), the
narrator’s companion (an acquaintance just made at a
party) continually does the opposite to what the prota-
gonist anticipates, e.g., he walks too slow or too fast.
However (as in the Type II, deeper autoscopy), the nar-
rator suddenly finds himself so embroiled that he
catches himself mirroring (!) his companion: “he began
walking again and I followed without realizing it...”
(Kafka, 1983, p. 13) As much as the narrator desires to
escape, he is unable to disentangle himself from the
acquaintance as if they were each incomplete on their
own, or different sides of the same person. E.T.A. Hoff-
mann’s New Year Eve’s Adventure [28] may have served
as inspiration for Kafka’s early story about doubling. In
Kafka’s The Castle, the protagonist, K., ironically experi-
ences an obstructiveness, similar to the companion in
Descriptions of a Struggle in his twin “helpers,”“ Artur”
and “Jeremias” very efforts to help. As evidence of their
status as doubles, incomplete on their own, K. wants to
treat them as a “single person” by calling them both by
the same name, “Artur.” In Blumfeld, an Elderly Bache-
lor, the two celluloid balls appear precisely in the
moment of need, or loneliness (as do the doubles in
Unhappiness and Descriptions of a Struggle), i.e., when
Bloomfield expresses the wish to have “a companion,
someone to witness” his daily activities. However, they
do exactly the opposite of what the Bachelor wants and
yet, like the deeper Type II autoscopy in which the
motoric body schema is implicated, are inextricably con-
nected to the bachelor’so w nm o v e m e n t s :“Suddenly,
quite unexpectedly, he [Blumfeld] ...with a jerk he turns
around in his chair. But the balls, equally alert, or per-
haps automatically following the law governing them,
also change their position the moment Blumfeld turns,
and hide behind his back.” [10], p. 188.
xvi. As in Metamorphosis,t h ep r o t a g o n i s t ’sb o d y( a s
f i c t i v ed o u b l eo ft h ea u t h o r ) is ultimately destroyed in
other Kafka stories (e.g., The Hunger Artist, In The
Penal Colony, The Bridge). Alternative fates of the prota-
gonist are that he is unable to die, Hunter Graccus,o r
similarly to Graccus, trapped in an unending journey
between worlds, e.g., A Country Doctor, The Bucket
Rider (see below).
xvii. Experimental light-deprivation temporarily
induces Charles Bonnet Syndrome (the experience of
complex visual-hallucinations, often accompanying
visual degeneration). Similarly, subjects who participated
in Lilly’s “isolation-tank” (sensory-deprivation) experi-
ments (floating in darkness immersed in salt-water at
body-temperature) reported vivid hallucinations.
xviii. The phenomenological psychiatrist, Binswanger,
for example, writes that the dramatist Ibsen removed
himself from others, i.e., sought isolation, to become
closer to them. The phenomenological theory proposes,
in a manner that the findings of social neuroscience
seems to be ever more closely approaching, that the
structure of the self is intersubjectivity, that deep within
the self, the self is the other but in way hidden to itself
[3]. Sartre [39] writes: “what we will discover at the
basis of ourselves is others...” (p. 115). Similarly, Kafka
describes his own efforts to overcome social isolation
“as a return to others by way of peculiar detour” [26],
p. 571, my translation.
xix. However, as Kurz [14] observers it is often not
clear whether Kafka means that the noise (which he
tried to escape) comes mostly from his family or from
his own self.
xx. In The Warden of the Tomb, the warden addresses
the prince with “Du” to which the prince, taken aback,
responds, “So we are on terms of intimacy, and yet
today is the first time I have seen you.” [10], p. 109.
Sudden, unexpected, even intrusive gestures of intimacy
between the protagonist and other character(s) in the
story also occurs as we have noted in “Unhappiness,”
and suggests that self and other, each incomplete on
their own, are inextricably related to one another in
(motoric-dreamlike autoscopy, i.e., Type II) autoscopic
doubling [3].
xxi. The “ghosts” may, in part, refer to the seductive,
or persecuting doubles of his own imagination, as the
child ghost (born from loneliness) in Unhappiness.
xxii. “I ...on awakening find hanging from my jaws, say
a rat, as indubitable proof of night labors which already
seem unreal” [10], p. 329). The Muir’s translation is mis-
leading and is more accurately rendered as “proof of last
night’s work which nearly appears as a dream“ (...fast
traumhaft erscheinenden Nachtarbeit).
xxiii. “But the most beautiful thing about my burrow
is its stillness... Of course, that is deceptive. At any
moment, it may be shattered and it may all be over”
[10], p. 327.
xxiv. “I find myself sensing an atmosphere of great
danger” [10], p. 332. Kafka’s The Neighbor exhibits a
similar paranoid structure, which is expressed in the
animal-narrator’s remark, “my burrow could not tolerate
an e i g h b o r ” [10], p. 358). In Kafka’s The Neighbor,t h e
protagonist attributes all sorts of malicious intent to his
neighbor, whom he scarcely knows and without the
slightest evidence: “I have never got a good look at him
yet, for his office key is always in his hand when he
passes me... The wretchedly thin walls betray the honor-
able and capable man but shield the dishonest. My tele-
phone is fixed on the wall that separates me from my
neighbor ... What is Harras [his neighbor] doing when I
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require a telephone, he uses mine. [no evidence for this]
He pushes his sofa against the wall and listens; while I
at the other side must fly to the telephone, listen to all
t h er e q u e s t so fm yc u s t o m e r s ,c o m et od i f f i c u l ta n d
grave decisions, carry out long calculations, but worst of
all, during all this time, involuntarily give Harras valu-
able information through the wall. Perhaps he doesn’t
wait even for the end of the conversation, but gets up at
the point where the matter has become clear to him,
flies through town with his usual haste, and before I
have hung up the receiver, is already at his goal working
against me.” [10], p. 425, my insert.
xxv. The Muirs translate “my whole body” for the ori-
ginal German “my body in all its parts” (...meines Körper
i na l l e ns e i n e nT e i l e n ).” The relationship, critical to the
current argument, between the burrow and anatomical
bodily-parts is not reflected in the Muirs’ translation.
xxvi. As Murray (2004) observes, Kafka wrote this
story during a period of his life in which he had finally
found some contentment but was also afraid of loosing
it. For this reason, and for reasons perhaps intrinsic to
hypnagogic Doeppelgaenger and autoscopic experiences,
the whole story is pervaded with paranoia with regard
to imaginary doubles (e.g., his hypothetical Waldbruder,
or the unknown animal(s), later in the story, boring its/
their way into his burrow to destroy him).
xxvii. The Muir’st r a n s l a t i o n ,“both physically as well
as mentally” is misleading as the animal states that the
labyrinth causes him physical (not mental pain): “...
auch körperlich überwinden...” This suggests the ardu-
ous path of the fetus during birth.
xxviii. Brentano’s student Husserl developed the “phe-
nomenological method.”
xxix. Husserl’sc l a i mo f“genetic” levels of meaning in
consciousness (starting from an abstract and non-
experienceable living present) is not a claim of micro-
genetic phases in the development of perceptual
Gestalt-meaning, which would be experimentally isol-
able (as in the tatiscopic experiments of microgenesis)
in real time (see [49], for review). That is, the genetic
phenomenological “reduction” (see below) is strictly a
reflective method. It makes abstract slices into con-
scious experience by ascertaining the prior conditions
of possibility, as if able to remove abstract layers as so
many layers of an onion and seeing what remains as
prior or invariant in the process, (see [3,48] for reviews
of phenomenologic method). Because the living pre-
sent, or now point, remains abstract and inaccessible
to experience [48], it is unable to serve as the basis of
what Michel Henry and the neo-phenomenologists, fol-
lowing him, claim to be the immediate experience of
self in so-called pre-reflective or naive self-awareness
(see next section).
xxx. Previously, I indicated that Kafka and Husserl
employ the same metaphor of descending into an
underworld - or in the German romantic tradition, a
descending into a mine (Bergwerk) - as indicating an
exploration of the depths of self [1,68]. Moreover, both
Kafka and Husserl use the image of double to describe
the reflective relationship to self as a splitting into I as
subject and as object (me), i.e., as “gap” see also
[2,3,9,48]. The French psychoanalyst, Lacan defines this
gap or split between the “I” and “me” to be the “uncon-
scious” itself. This differs from Lacan’s phenomenologic
contemporaries, however, who claimed rather that this
“split” belongs to the nature of human embodied self
precisely as a process of self-transcendence, i.e.,
an ongoing emergent and dynamic field determined
by a “lability” of thresholds (Schwellenlabilität) [53]
between conscious and “unconscious” processes (see
[9,19,48,53,62]).
xxxi. “Sure enough, this being in itself of the stream of
consciousness is entirely its own sphere of Being by vir-
tue of the fact that its future is conversely not ‘in itself’”
(Husserl [67], p. 208, my translation).
xxxii. As already indicated, Husserl finds a similar
paradox when thinking about or reflecting on our own
“current” experience, which, by necessity, is retrospec-
tive. Every reflecting on our experience itself occurs
within the temporal passing of consciousness and is sub-
ject to the same “laws” of “time consciousness” as the
original reflected on experience. The very act of thinking
about or reflecting requires a splitting of the “I” (Ichspal-
tung) into an currently thinking or reflecting “I” and a
reflected (already past !)"me.” When we are caught up in
perceiving or experiencing things, there is a loss of self
(Selbstverlorenheit), a naiveté about our role in con-
structing the experience: “Admittedly, the moment I
begin to reflect, the naïve perceiving by the self-forget-
t i n gIi sa l r e a d yp a s t .Ia mo n l ya b l et og r a s pt h i sb y
reaching back - in the reflecting - into what has
‘remained in consciousness’ as retention, an immediate
memory which attaches itself backwards to the original
experience” ( H u s s e r l ,[ 5 8 ] ,p .8 8 ,m yt r a n sa n d
emphases). I am able to reflect on my original naïve
self-forgetting which is absorbed in the experiencing
only because the I itself has ‘split’ (Ichspaltung)i n t oa
reflecting I and the object of its reflection, the naïve I
just previously engrossed in experiencing (i.e., the self
now as object or “me”). The splitting or objectifying of
one’s subjectivity as past is passive and occurs automati-
cally. It is not as Zahavi and other adherents of the lar-
gely Henryan interpretation of Husserl (see below)
propose, that reflection “introduces” the splitting.
xxxiii. As I [48] have recently proposed, the “phenom-
enological unconscious” (Husserl) is two-pronged: it is
both the lowermost stratum of the primal sensory
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pre-affective syntheses underlying the background of any
emergent Gestalt (which, in turn, affects consciousness
in its emergent contrast saliency over against its back-
ground), but it is also the past, the “night” of the uncon-
scious, into which every emergent saliency passes,
progressively loosing its affective contours and ability to
attract awareness. This self-dividing (Entzweiung)o f
time consciousness (as self-displacing totality), is neces-
sary for the memory of a past self, so that the two selves,
past and present are related in terms of the hidden unity
of a Gestalt-circle or revolving door principle. The
moment I become narratively entranced with my past
self, my present self goes in the background, but to the
degree that “I” narrate this past, by virtue of narrating it,
“I” transcend it as an already past “me” embedded in the
past situation, and thus obtain the provisional narrative
mastery of a traumatic past in the telling of it [18]. Cri-
tically, the unconscious in the Husserlian sense (as
enabling this self-dividing of its own experiential field) is
not the perceptual or experiential background, but
underlies it, making it possible [48,67,68].
xxxiv. That is, precisely to the extent that the neophe-
nomenological approach bases itself on Henry’sc o n c e p t
of ipseity, it distances itself from the phenomenological
tradition [71]. It is both “neo-” but also recalls some of
the dogmatic pronouncements of a theologically
invested scholasticism. Henry interprets his own work
as “antithetical” to his phenomelogic predecessors (e.g.,
Gadamer, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre,
Scheler) precisely because he extends the “phenomeno-
logic” project far beyond what any of his predecessors
deem possible, and in a way that contradicts them. For
example, he proposes that the human subject, as natural,
pre-reflective or naïve bodily consciousness, is the reali-
zation of its own essence through the manifestation of
immediate “absolute knowledge” of itself (in autoaffec-
tion) as “Being in itself.” Readers acquainted with the
other phenemenologic authors listed above will no
doubt see in Henry’s proposed pre-reflective self-aware-
ness a rebelliously barbed contradiction to each of their
methods and main theses in turn. I discuss this funda-
mental discontinuity with the “phenomenological tradi-
tion” (Gadamer) inherent in Henry’s concepts and their
neophenomenological appropriation elsewhere [6,71].
x x x v .F r o mt h eL a t i nf o rs e l f ,o ri t s e l f ,ipse.H e n r y ’s
use of the term “ipseity” (embraced by his hyper-reflex-
ive neophenomenologic adherents) is idiosyncratic and
should not be confused with Ricoeur’s definition which
does not overlap with Henry’s.
xxxvi. What Henry writes about the living body and
its double as object representation could just as well be
said about the body subject and its hypnagogic halluci-
nation as double, whereby the patient becomes confused
(in Type II dreamlike-delusional autoscopy) which body
is really his and which belongs to the double. That is,
the relationship between the lived-body as subject and
its double is “symbolic.” Nevertheless, what Henry [73]
means here by linguistic “symbolism” differs from my
definition of the “symbolic” doubling of the self in Kaf-
ka’s literary narratives and a general characteristic of
hypnagogic hallucinations [2,3,47,48].
xxxvii. The Gestalt-circle occurs according to a “revol-
ving door principle” (Drehtuerprinzip): “Each act is per-
ception and movement. However, I am unable to
perceive in my perception the movement that made it
possible. Conversely, I am unable to access in the move-
ment the perception that guides it. ... Movement and
perception stand in a relationship of mutual conceal-
ment” (Von Weizsäcker, [53], p. 200, my translation).
The relationship is circular in the sense that one is
“unable to ever establish where the relationship begins
or ends” (von Weizsäcker [77], p. 26; my translation).
xxxviii. This is not merely a philosophic debate, a bat-
tle of egos (as suggested by my “neophenomenological”
colleagues responses to my criticisms so far), or pedan-
tic, hair-splitting arguments about how to interpret a
tradition of texts. What is at stake is how to conceptua-
lize and study the human self and its disorders, and to
what extent the phenomenology of the subjective experi-
ence of the patient may contribute to neuropsychiatric
research. My colleagues’ marked defensive intolerance of
disagreement (in their published responses up to this
point) unfortunately more reflects on their own experi-
ence of vulnerabilities in their arguments, and how they
elect to cope with them, than on the ability to muster
some good will to help advance the field through poised
academic debate concerning issues of substance. So far,
they have responded to criticism by providing (irrele-
vant) ad hominem arguments, taking my statements out
of context, quietly changing their own position as if it
already included whatever I criticized (i.e., presenting
moving targets) by posturing, “we meant this all along,”
etc. I refer the interested reader to the upcoming issue
of Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology devoted to this
debate, and our contribution, “The phenomenology
wars: self, psychopathology and neuroscience”[71].
xxxix. Phenomenological method (as proposed by
Husserl) offers a disciplined sequence of steps: 1) Phe-
nomenological reduction is a “leading back” (from the
Latin re-ducere)f r o mo n e ’s current engagement with
the world to examine (reflectively) the “streaming-con-
sciousness” in the here and now; this requires the brack-
eting of common sense folk-psychological/folk-physical
assumptions about how minds and objects behave in the
world; 2) Abstracting the essential meaning-structure of
an object by bracketing (or suspending) its reference to
reality and examining its limits by freely imagining
Mishara Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:13
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/13
Page 33 of 37variants which fall within its semantic boundaries (“eide-
tic, imaginative variation”); 3) Rigorously describing the
“results” in a technical language which is as sensitive as
possible to fine details of the experiencing while moni-
toring this language for lapses into reification of our
common sense folk-psychology; 4) Integrating the find-
ings into a theoretical framework which is then
imparted to a community of investigators for “replica-
tion” using the same method. The phenomenological
method (which I present here in a simplified manner)
has been criticized as being less transparent than it
claims (e.g., Gadamer [8]). It is very difficult to explicitly
follow a method without implicitly employing the even-
tual “expertise” that accrues through practice (i.e., the
procedural know-how and accompanying “prejudices”
(Vor-urteile) we acquire over time and apply without
awareness) (See Mishara [6]). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty
[59] observes that phenomenological reduction (i.e.,
reflection on our experience) is inevitably mediated by
language even when we claim to be describing nonver-
bal, pre-linguistic, “mute” sources of meaning (see [48]).
This problem becomes even more pronounced when
one claims access to an “intuition” of life which is pre-
reflective, pre-linguistic and yet captured in reflective,
verbal concepts about that experience (as the neopheno-
menologic pre-reflective ipseity), thus, recalling a con-
found identified in the experimental literature as the
“verbal overshadowing” effect.
xl. Every reflecting on our experience itself occurs
within time and is subject to the same “laws” of “time
consciousness” as the original reflected on experience.
The very act of thinking about or reflecting requires a
splitting of the “I” (Ichspaltung) into an currently think-
ing or reflecting “I” and a reflected (already past !)"me.”
Husserl writes: “Admittedly, the moment I begin to
reflect, the naïve perceiving by the self-forgetting I is
already past. I am only able to grasp this by reaching
b a c k-i nt h er e f l e c t i n g-i n t ow h a th a s‘remained in
consciousness’ as retention, an immediate memory
which attaches itself backwards to the original experi-
ence” (Husserl [58], 88, my trans and emphases). The
splitting or objectifying of one’s subjectivity as past is
(contra Zahavi) passive and occurs automatically.
xli. Held criticizes the phenomenologist, Gerd Brand’s
argument (later adopted by Zahavi and other advocates
of the neophenomenological position) that since we
have reflective self-awareness, this “must“ be preceded
by pre-reflective self-awareness. Gerd Brand calls this
pre-reflective source of reflection, “rudimentary reflec-
tion” (Reflektion im Ansatz). Held writes: “As these
assertions are made from the standpoint of reflection,
they either remain empty in terms of any positive con-
tent or not to be taken literally at their word” [66], 105
my trans). It is puzzling then, that Zahavi should cite
Held as supporter for his concept of pre-reflective self-
awareness.
xlii. In sleep paralysis (a symptom of narcolepsy), the
patient experiences an inability to move when falling
asleep or upon waking. Although conscious of the sur-
roundings, the patient may, at the same time, have
nightmarish hallucinatory experiences [3].
xliii. As reported above, individuals isolated for long
periods (e.g., mountaineers, explorers, sailors, and cast-
aways) report a variant of the Doppelgänger experience,
the “feeling of a presence” (FOP) in which another sub-
ject is felt to be in the self’s proximity but not seen.
“The phenomenological-psychiatrist, Jaspers [60] noted
that it is not possible to classify the feeling FOP (leib-
hafte Bewusstheit...) as a perceptual hallucination or as a
delusional belief. Nevertheless, it may harbinger a subse-
quent “transition” to hallucinations and/or delusions.
FOP may serve as a stage in the development of these
other psychopathological phenomena and continue to
be a component of these experiences. For example,
prior to the development of more florid symptoms of
active paranoid psychosis, prodromal schizophrenia
patients may feel they are ‘watched’ or ‘observed’ with-
out anyone nearby [60]. Although the idea - as far as I
know - has not received attention in the current litera-
ture, the phenomenology and underlying neurobiological
mechanisms of FOP may indeed support the view that
FOP is a critical component in the development of delu-
sions and hallucinations in schizophrenia. (Mishara [3]).
xliv. Here we have a doubling between the protagonist
and the artist but also a second doubling between the
artist and Kafka as writer. As noted above, the painter-
artist in the Trial, Tintoretto, attempts to provide a por-
trait of the protagonist, Josef K., in parallel to Kafka’s
own efforts to develop in writing a “portrait” of the
same character.
xlv. Interestingly, this relationship of mutual exclusion
extends to the remembering of dreams. “Autobiographi-
cal” episodic, or narrative memory is what the individual
explicitly remembers about the course of experiences.
Each experience is ‘tagged’ in explicit episodic memory
a sh a v i n go c c u r r e da tas p e c i f i ct i m ea n dp l a c ei nt h e
person’s life (even if this time and place are not always
recalled with precision). Husserl calls this contextual
tagging its temporal place, “Zeitstelle.” The phenomeno-
logical psychiatrist Wyss [106], who had trained with
both Jaspers and von Weizsaecker, describes dreaming
as the “loss of perspective” or a-perspectival. Since
dreams are not experienced by an awake, embodied-self,
embedded in identifiable space and time, they are not
directly accessible to autobiographical memory. It is
only when we recall our dreams that they become acces-
sible as remembered, as having occurred at this parti-
cular place or time in our lives ; i.e., a spatio-temporal
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structures - is not provided during the original dreaming
but only when it is subsequently remembered. I have
proposed that traumatic memories which are often just
fragments which return in an unbidden, intrusive man-
ner during both awake experience and nightmares are
not available to the conscious autobiographical memory
system. It is only by narrating them (not just experien-
cing their intrusive recollection in flashbacks), i.e., by
either writing [18] or speaki n gt h e mt h a tt h e yt r a n s f e r
from an unconscious fear-conditioned memory system
t oam o r ec o n s c i o u sa n dv o l u n tarily available episodic
memory system. That is, narrating the trauma is healing
and brings a feeling of “mastery,” because it transfers
“piece by piece” the fear-conditioned traumatic learning
from the unconscious to the more voluntarily accessible
conscious memory system. The patient experiences clo-
sure and less vulnerability to the unbidden flashback
episodes [18]. In subsequent publications (in collabora-
tion with Dr. Catharina Bonnemann, Medizinische
Hochschule Hannover), we examine how the narrator’s
embodied “point of view” (and corresponding transform
of reference frame) is critical for the narrative’s healing
power.
xlvi. “Niemand wird hier lesen was ich hier schreibe,”
says Graccus. The English translation tries to soften this
contradiction by incorrectly translating this as, “Nobody
will read what I have to say here.”[ 1 0 ] ,p .2 3 0 .K a f k a
employs a device of self-reference built into the narra-
tive to show that the narrator as “I” is always concealed
behind the content of his narratives. Similarly, the film
director Wim Wenders weaves his signature into the
content of the filmic images to demonstrate an irrepar-
able breach between author and audience via the non-
transparency of narrative content back to its creator.
Such references to the creator built into the filmic
i m a g em a yb ef o u n da tt h ee n do f“Kings of the Road,”
where all the letters of the movie theater’s( ! )n e o ns i g n
Weise Wand (literally meaning “blank screen) are
burned out except for the first W’so ft h et w ow o r d s
(the initials of Wim Wenders own name). Thus Wen-
ders autographs the end of his film in the way that a
painter signs his painting. In Wenders’“ State of Things,”
the film director, Fritz who is trapped with his cast in an
abandoned Portugal seacoast hotel without any film to
continue production. He complains to his cast that
there is so much going on right now in a random sort
of way, even as he is speaking to them. They could cap-
ture this with a few cameras but they have none. He
says, “There is no film in the camera. A lot things are
happening simultaneously. If we had more than one
camera, but we do not even have one; [and then contra-
dicting all that he has just said by now referring to the
film as indeed the precondition for the audience’s
experience] All this is fiction.” While the reported
absence of a camera may be true of the narrative of the
film’s story which is about the interruption of a film’s
production due to the absence of film, it is not true of
the film which the audience watches. That is to the
extent that audience becomes entranced by the filmic
narrative, which reports that there is no functioning
camera, they must suspend their more immediate
experience that they are watching a film clearly captured
by a movie camera. Similarly, Magritte points to the
paradox of self-reference in the pictorial image in his
celebrated picture of a pipe, entitled, “This is not a
pipe.” That is, narrative, even the pictorial or perfor-
mance type of narrative previously discussed, establishes
a non-transparent relationship between author and audi-
ence by creating the illusion of narrative, as the framing
of imaginary time within real time whereby the audience
experiences a vulnerability to becoming absorbed or
embedded in the scenes depicted. We also saw this in
the relationship of trance between the medicine man
and his audience who must also put himself in a trance
to become convincing. However, this non-transparent
relationship between narrator and his/her narratives,
which encourages artists such as Kafka or Wenders to
insert their own initials into the body of the text as a
kind of reminder, is not only between artist and audi-
ence but also of the artist with his/her own self during
the narrative act.
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